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NOTHING PERSONAL (OR SUBJECT MATTER) ABOUT IT: 
JURISDICTIONAL RISK AS AN IMPETUS FOR NON-
TRIBAL OPT-OUTS FROM TRIBAL ECONOMIES, AND THE 
NEED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSE 
Joel Pruett* 
I. Introduction 
Tribal civil jurisdiction, as it pertains to non-tribal investors, is too 
complicated.1 The current scheme, which has been called an “unstable 
jurisdictional crazy quilt”2 and a “procedural and jurisdictional 
nightmare,”3 damages tribal economies and frustrates Congress’s “twin 
goals of [tribal] economic self-sufficiency and political self-
determination.”4 Indeed, not only is the canon of tribal civil jurisdiction 
filled with incoherence5 and judicial “equivocat[ion],”6 but the tribal 
exhaustion doctrine7 also imposes on potential non-tribal litigants the threat 
of expending substantial “time, money and effort litigating . . . in . . . Tribal 
                                                                                                             
 * J.D./M.B.A. candidate, University of Oklahoma, 2016; B.S., Kansas State 
University, 2011. I would like to extend thanks to Professor Erin Means, my faculty advisor, 
for her guidance and comments on my research and writing. 
 1. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 376 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that 
tribal courts’ civil jurisdiction with respect to non-Indians is “‘ill-defined,’ since this Court’s 
own pronouncements . . . have pointed in seemingly opposite directions”) (citation omitted). 
 2. Id. at 383 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 3. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 853 (1985) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 4. 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(12) (2012). 
 5. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (Souter, J., concurring) 
(indicating that the canon is “coherent” only if it follows Montana). 
 6. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 387 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 7. The doctrine of tribal exhaustion requires that a litigant seeking to challenge an 
exercise of tribal civil jurisdiction generally must first exhaust his remedies in tribal court. 
See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985); Iowa 
Mutual, 480 U.S. at 16-17. After exhausting tribal remedies, litigants may seek subsequent 
review of the tribal court’s civil jurisdiction in federal or state court. See, e.g., Nat’l Farmers, 
471 U.S. at 847-48, 857; Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638, 640-41, 647 (S.D. 1993) 
(declining to enforce a tribal court judgment for tribal party’s failure to “clearly and 
convincingly [show] that the tribal court had jurisdiction” over a non-tribal party). For 
exhaustive coverage of the doctrine, see generally Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, 
Construction and Application of Federal Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, 186 A.L.R. Fed. 71 
(2003). 
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Court” before “seeking to terminate the tribal court actions against them” in 
federal court.8 Throughout this paper, the combination of uncertainty in the 
law of tribal jurisdiction and the significant cost of litigating in both tribal 
and federal (or state) court to resolve case-by-case jurisdictional questions 
will be referred to as “Jurisdictional Risk.” 
The confusion of the legal doctrine and concomitant uncertainty arises 
from the fact that civil jurisdiction in tribal courts is built on a scheme 
vastly different from that used by state and federal courts. Tribal civil 
jurisdiction considers the parties’ tribal affiliations,9 whether the suit-
inducing transaction or occurrence took place on Indian-owned land,10 and 
whether the land was located on an Indian reservation.11 Furthermore, the 
canon of tribal civil jurisdiction takes into account considerations of federal 
policy and tribal sovereignty12 and any intervening federal statutes,13 just to 
name a few of the differences among the many additional idiosyncratic, 
case-specific considerations in establishing tribal civil jurisdiction.  
Non-tribal parties seeking to enter commercial relationships with the 
tribes are thus faced with a great deal of uncertainty and a heavy burden of 
costly, time-consuming, and less-than-fool-proof due diligence.14 The 
significant number of factual permutations inherent to analyzing tribal civil 
jurisdiction requires an untangling of numerous case law nuances and case-
                                                                                                             
 8. See, e.g., Koniag, Inc. v. Kanam, No. 3:12–cv–00077–SLG, 2012 WL 2576210, at 
*5 (D. Alaska 2012). See also Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1157 
(10th Cir. 2011) (“Crowe faces a significant risk of financial injury” because “there is a 
significant risk that Crowe will be forced to expend unnecessary time, money, and effort 
litigating . . . in the Muscogee Nation District Court—a court which likely does not have 
jurisdiction over it.”) (quoting Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 609 F.Supp.2d 1211, 
1222 (N.D. Okla. 2009)), aff’d 640 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 9. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (articulating “the general 
proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the 
activities of nonmembers of the tribe”). 
 10. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001) (“The ownership status of land . . . is 
only one factor to consider . . . . It may sometimes be a dispositive factor.”). 
 11. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (“The cases in this Court have 
consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations.”). 
 12. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 449 (1997). 
 13. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 220 (“[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, the question 
has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to 
make their own laws and be ruled by them.”). 
 14. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HOSKISSON ET AL., COMPETING FOR ADVANTAGE 252 (Jack W. 
Calhoun et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008) (discussing added costs of faulty due diligence in the 
acquisition context). 
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specific determinations of racial identity and land ownership. Although 
federal court precedent has demonstrated a consistent commitment to 
supporting tribal justice as part of a tribe’s “inherent sovereign powers,”15 
the vagaries and inconsistent application of tribal civil jurisdiction over 
non-Indians leave non-tribal providers of debt and equity capital 
(hereinafter “Investors”) uncertain of the court systems to which they have 
potentially subjected themselves. In fact, theories of financial economics 
and business strategy, a study on reservation economics, and recent 
Supreme Court precedent indicate that many Investors may simply forgo 
the Jurisdictional Risk of tribal investment by investing elsewhere.16 
Existing solutions to the problem—lawsuits challenging tribal 
jurisdiction and careful contract drafting—are fraught with their own 
uncertainties and risks, making them unsuitable for mitigating Jurisdictional 
Risk and corresponding damage to tribal economies.17 Therefore, given the 
apparent relationship between uncertainty in tribal civil jurisdiction and 
decreased non-tribal investment, in contradiction to the federal policy of 
“[tribal] economic self-sufficiency,”18 Congress should break its long 
silence on issues of tribal civil jurisdiction.19 Legislative action, ideally by 
administrative delegation, would provide additional guidance for courts and 
reduce uncertainty for Investors so as to encourage economic development 
on tribal reservations.20 
This comment will begin to explore the relationship between tribal civil 
jurisdiction and tribal economic development by providing background 
information in Part II, which reviews federal policy on tribal sovereignty 
and economics, as well as early case law underlying the modern canon of 
tribal civil jurisdiction. Part III analyzes the doctrinal problems, beginning 
with a review of uncertainties and judicial schisms in the doctrine; 
proceeding to a review of anecdotal evidence that strongly suggests a link 
between uncertainty in the law of tribal civil jurisdiction and alleged 
transactional discrimination; and concluding with a financial economics-
based review of Investor incentives. Part IV offers solutions, beginning 
with two reactive coping strategies for parties subject to the current 
jurisdictional doctrine: suits to challenge tribal jurisdiction and contract 
                                                                                                             
 15. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). 
 16. See infra Section III.C. 
 17. See infra Section IV.A.-B. 
 18. 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(12) (2012). 
 19. See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 
(1985) (“[T]he power of the Federal Government over the Indian tribes is plenary.”). 
 20. See infra Section IV.D. 
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drafting to reduce risk. Part IV concludes with proactive, long-term 
legislative and administrative approaches to rebalancing Congress’s “twin 
goals of [tribal] economic self-sufficiency and political self-determination” 
in the context of tribal jurisdiction.21 
II. Background 
A. Federal Policy on Tribal Sovereignty22 and Economics 
No longer fully sovereign,23 Indian tribes are subject to federal “plenary” 
authority, thogh vestiges of their earlier “inherent” sovereignty remain.24 
Contrary early policies of tribal assimilation notwithstanding,25 modern 
federal policies value “tribal self-government and self-determination.”26 
The Supreme Court, in Montana v. United States, explained that 
“through their original incorporation into the United States as well as 
through specific treaties and statutes, the Indian tribes have lost many of the 
attributes of sovereignty,” particularly with respect to “relations between an 
Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.”27 This is so because “the 
dependent status of Indian tribes within [United States] territorial 
jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to 
determine their external relations.”28 
Federal statutes also illuminate modern policy at the intersection of tribal 
economics and sovereignty. Congress has articulated generalized support 
for tribal “political self-determination,”29 especially with respect to “tribal 
government involvement in and commitment to improving tribal justice 
                                                                                                             
 21. 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(12). 
 22. Although an exhaustive review of tribal sovereignty is beyond the scope of this 
paper, for a recent, generalized treatment of the subject matter, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, 
Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and the Inherent Powers of Indian Tribes, 39 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 77 (2014-2015). 
 23. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981). 
 24. Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 851. 
 25. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1959) (identifying a congressional 
policy intending the “full-fledged” assimilation of tribes, with the eventual transfer of all 
jurisdictional power to the states once “the educational and economic status of the Indians 
permits the change without disadvantage to them”). 
 26. Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856. 
 27. Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-64 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 
(1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012)) (emphasis omitted). 
 28. Id. at 564 (citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326, superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 
1301(2)) (emphasis omitted). 
 29. 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(12) (2012). 
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systems.”30 This strong support for tribal judicial sovereignty appears to 
sometimes conflict with interests in eliminating discrimination in 
transactions between tribal and non-tribal parties and supporting tribal 
economic development. This policy conflict is exacerbated by the fact that 
Congress has failed to provide courts with any guidance as to how interests 
in tribal sovereignty and economics should be balanced, leading the 
apolitical courts31 to develop a noncommittal, unpredictable, and limbo-like 
doctrine of tribal civil jurisdiction.32 
Congress, however, implicitly acknowledges a relationship between “the 
twin goals of [tribal] economic self-sufficiency and political self-
determination.”33 More specific to jurisdictional matters, Congress has also 
articulated a goal of “strengthen[ing] tribal governments and . . . 
economies. . . through the enhancement and . . . development of tribal court 
systems,”34 demonstrating an interest in continuous development of federal 
legislation to achieve this goal.35 
                                                                                                             
 30. 25 U.S.C. § 3601(9) (2012). 
 31. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) 
(“Judges . . . are not part of either political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some 
cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal 
policy preferences”); cf. DANIEL J. GIFFORD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
72 (2d ed. 2010) (“In Chevron . . . [i]t was more appropriate, Justice Stevens ruled, for 
policy choices to be made by the President—who is responsible to the electorate at the 
polls—than for courts—which are not politically responsible—to make those policy 
choices”); Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from 
Environmental Cases, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 21 (1984) (“Officials within [an 
administrative] agency who are not responsive to [political] views risk losing their jobs. . . . 
In contrast, judges are appointed for life in some jurisdictions. In other jurisdictions, judges 
are elected, but the elections are not designed to make judges politically responsive. Judicial 
terms are long, many elections are uncontested, and the issue in contested elections is 
usually competence rather than the popularity of decisions. Thus, agencies are more 
responsive to the political process than are courts and, therefore, are the more appropriate 
body for deciding discretionary, policy-choice issues.”). 
 32. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 391-92 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (“Montana and our other cases concerning tribal civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers occupy a middle ground between our cases that provide for 
nearly absolute tribal sovereignty over tribe members and our rule that tribes have no 
inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers.”) (citations omitted). 
 33. See 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(12) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 34. 25 U.S.C. § 3652(3) (2012); see also 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(9)(A)-(B) (requiring the 
federal government to “assist Indian tribes with the creation of appropriate economic and 
political conditions” that would “encourage investment from outside sources” and “facilitate 
economic ventures with outside entities”). 
 35. 25 U.S.C. § 3652(5). 
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More generalized economic policies call upon the federal government to 
enhance tribal access to “resources of the private market,” “adequate 
capital,” and “technical expertise.”36 Indeed, Congress has indicated that 
the federal government itself should “provide capital . . . to help develop 
and utilize Indian resources . . . to a point where the Indians will fully 
exercise responsibility for the utilization and management of their own 
resources and where they will enjoy a standard of living . . . comparable to 
that enjoyed by non-Indians.”37  
Perhaps animating these economic policies is a congressional finding 
that “the capacity of Indian tribes to build strong tribal governments and 
vigorous economies is hindered by the[ir] inability . . . to engage 
[surrounding] communities . . . and outside investors in economic 
activities.”38 This effect may contribute to the fact that “Native Americans 
suffer higher rates of unemployment, poverty, poor health, substandard 
housing, and associated social ills than those of any other group in the 
United States.”39 
B. Foundational Case Law 
Although the nuanced doctrine of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians remains difficult to apply in fact-specific situations, some 
underlying principles have crystallized. As a general matter, tribes may not 
exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, except as provided by statutes 
or treaties.40 Pursuant to Montana v. United States,41 however, tribal courts 
may exercise “inherent”42 tribal civil jurisdiction over non-tribal entities 
                                                                                                             
 36. See 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(12)(A)-(C). 
 37. 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012). 
 38. 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(7). 
 39. Id. § 4301(a)(8). 
 40. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 449 (1997) (“As the Court made plain 
in Montana, the general rule and [its] exceptions there announced govern only in the absence 
of a delegation of tribal authority by treaty or statute.”); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 
544, 565 (1981) (articulating a “general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an 
Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe”). But see Iowa Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (articulating a general rule that tribal civil 
jurisdiction over “non-Indians on reservation lands . . . presumptively lies in the tribal courts 
unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute”). But see also 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 380 (2001) (“[W]e resisted th[is] overbreadth of the Iowa 
Mutual dictum [in Strate].”); Strate, 520 U.S. at 451-52 (“Read in context . . . [the language 
of Iowa Mutual] scarcely supports the view that the Montana rule does not bear on tribal-
court adjudicatory authority in cases involving nonmember defendants.”). 
 41. See infra Section II.B.1 for additional discussion of Montana. 
 42. See 450 U.S. at 565-66. 
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where non-tribal entities enter into commercial relationships with tribal 
entities43 or where a non-tribal entity threatens tribal self-governance.44 
However, the doctrine of tribal exhaustion45 requires that a litigant 
seeking to challenge an exercise of tribal civil jurisdiction generally must 
first exhaust his remedies in tribal court46 as “tribal courts are best qualified 
to interpret and apply tribal law.”47 After exhausting tribal remedies, 
litigants may seek subsequent review of the tribal court’s civil jurisdiction 
in state48 or federal court.49  
In reviewing the legitimacy of an exercise of tribal civil jurisdiction over 
a non-Indian, federal courts have considered multiple factors with varying 
degrees of influence. These factors include whether suit-inducing conduct 
took place on an Indian reservation,50 whether the land on which the suit-
                                                                                                             
 43. See id. at 565 (“A tribe may regulate . . . the activities of nonmembers who enter 
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, 
contracts, leases, or other arrangements.”). 
 44. See id. at 566 (“A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority 
over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct 
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the 
health or welfare of the tribe.”). 
 45. A complete discussion of the tribal exhaustion doctrine is beyond the scope of this 
paper. For exhaustive coverage of the doctrine, see generally Buckman, supra note 7. 
 46. See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985) 
(indicating that although the issue of tribal civil jurisdiction is a matter of federal law subject 
to federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, tribal court “exhaustion is required 
before such a claim may be entertained by a federal court”); Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 16-17 
(indicating that litigants must also exhaust tribal court remedies before challenging tribal 
civil jurisdiction in federal court where the federal challenge is supported by diversity 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332). But see Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21 (“We do 
not suggest that exhaustion would be required where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction ‘is 
motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,’ . . . or where the action is 
patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile 
because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.”) 
(quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977)). 
 47. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 16. 
 48. See, e.g., Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638 (S.D. 1993) (declining to enforce a 
tribal court judgment for tribal party’s failure to “clearly and convincingly [show] that the 
tribal court had jurisdiction” over a non-tribal party ).  
 49. See Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857 (“Until petitioners have exhausted the remedies 
available to them in the Tribal Court system, it would be premature for a federal court to 
consider any relief.”) (citation omitted). 
 50. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (“[T]o allow the exercise of state 
jurisdiction here would . . . infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. It is 
immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction 
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inducing conduct took place was owned by a tribal party,51 and whether the 
parties were affiliated with the tribe.52 Federal court review of tribal civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indians is also guided by “careful examination of 
tribal sovereignty, . . . detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch 
policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial 
decisions.”53 
1. Montana’s Presumption Against Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Non-
Indians and Jurisdiction-Enabling Exceptions 
In the “pathmarking case”54 of Montana v. United States, the Supreme 
Court articulated the general rule that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over 
non-tribal parties, subject to two exceptions that would allow otherwise. 55 
The first exception (the “Commercial Relationship Exception”) provides for 
tribal regulatory jurisdiction, “through taxation, licensing, or other means,” 
over “the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with 
the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or 
other arrangements.”56 The second exception (the “Self-Governance 
Exception”) provides for the tribes’ “retain[ed] inherent . . . civil authority” 
with respect to non-tribal parties on non-tribal land within the reservation 
“when [their] conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”57 
The case arose from the question of whether the Crow Tribe of Montana 
had the regulatory jurisdiction to ban all non-tribal hunting and fishing on 
non-tribal land within the Crow reservation.58 In the Second Treaty of Fort 
Laramie of 1868 between the United States and the Crow Tribe, the Crow 
                                                                                                             
with an Indian took place there. The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the 
authority of Indian governments over their reservations.”) (citations omitted). 
 51. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 387-88 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (“Given the facts of Montana, it was not clear whether the 
status of the persons being regulated, or the status of the land where the [suit-inducing 
conduct] occurred, led the Court to develop Montana’s jurisdictional rule and its exceptions. 
In subsequent cases, we indicated that the nonmember status of the person being regulated 
determined Montana’s application, while in other cases we indicated that the fee simple 
status of the land triggered application of Montana.”) (citations omitted). 
 52. See id. 
 53. Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855-56. 
 54. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997). 
 55. 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). 
 56. Id. at 565. 
 57. Id. at 566. 
 58. Id. at 547. 
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reservation was “‘set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and 
occupation’ of the Crow Tribe,” and it banned all “non-Indians except 
agents of the Government [from] . . . ‘pass[ing] over, settl[ing] upon, or 
resid[ing] in’ the reservation.”59 After signing that treaty, however, 
Congress passed at least six allotment acts that authorized tribal allottees to 
transfer their parcels to non-tribal parties after the conclusion of a twenty-
five-year holding period.60  
The Crow Tribe had instituted bans on nonmember hunting and fishing 
within their reservation despite the fact that thirty percent of the reservation 
land was owned by parties not affiliated with the tribe, that fishing on the 
Big Horn River would not be possible but for a federal dam, and that the 
state of Montana—which had refused to cede its alleged regulatory 
authority—stocked the reservation with fish and game.61 
The United States sued on behalf of the tribe, seeking declaratory 
judgment that regulatory jurisdiction over hunting and fishing was reserved 
to the Crow Tribe and the federal government.62 The Supreme Court held 
that the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie required the federal government to 
bar non-tribal entry to tribal-owned reservation land, which implicitly gave 
the tribe regulatory jurisdiction over hunting and fishing only on land 
subject to the tribe’s “absolute and undisturbed use and occupation.”63 This 
treaty provision, the Court opined, barred tribal regulatory authority over 
“lands held in fee by non-Indians.”64 Citing Puyallup Tribe v. Washington 
Game Department, the Court also explained that “treaty rights with respect 
to reservation lands must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of 
those lands.”65 
Ultimately, the Court in Montana held that the Crow Tribe could not 
regulate hunting and fishing with respect to non-tribal members on non-
tribal land within the reservation because neither the Commercial 
Relationship Exception nor the Self-Governance Exception applied.66 In 
reaching its decision, the Court considered factors of parties’ tribal 
affiliations and tribal land ownership, but the analysis is too ambiguous to 
indicate “whether the status of the persons being regulated, or the status of 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. at 548. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 548-49. 
 62. Id. at 549. 
 63. Id. at 558-59 (quoting Treaty with the Crows, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 561 (citing Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977)). 
 66. Id. at 566. 
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the land . . . led the Court to develop Montana’s jurisdictional rule and its 
exceptions.”67  
Thus, although the rationale of the Montana rule is not abundantly clear, 
in light of the fact that neither exception applied, the case was governed by 
the general rule that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over non-tribal parties.68 
2. Limiting the Jurisdiction-Enabling Montana Exceptions to Mere 
Specific Jurisdiction to Preserve Montana’s General Rule Against Tribal 
Civil Jurisdiction over Non-Indians 
Subsequent cases interpreting Montana have restricted both of its 
exceptions to authorize only specific—not general—jurisdiction over non-
Indians. 
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley indicates that Montana’s Commercial 
Relationship Exception merely provides specific regulatory jurisdiction 
over non-tribal parties operating on non-tribal land.69 In that case, a non-
tribal hotelier questioned the Navajo Nation’s regulatory jurisdiction under 
Montana.70 The Navajo Nation had exercised regulatory authority by 
levying a hotel occupancy tax against the hotelier’s guests despite the fact 
that his hotel was on non-tribal land within the Navajo reservation.71 After 
exhausting tribal appeals, the hotelier sued in federal court, ultimately 
appealing to the Supreme Court.72 The Court found no regulatory 
jurisdiction, holding that the plaintiff did not consent to a hotel occupancy 
tax levied against its guests merely by having access to tribal emergency 
services or by acquiring “Indian trader” status.73 
The Court reasoned that in order to achieve regulatory jurisdiction the 
Navajo tax must share a nexus with a jurisdiction-enabling consensual 
relationship.74 Furthermore, the Court held that tribal parties may not 
circumvent the nexus requirement by pointing to “the generalized 
availability of tribal [governmental] services,” because general regulatory 
jurisdiction over non-tribal members under Montana’s consensual 
relationship exception “would swallow the [general Montana] rule . . . 
                                                                                                             
 67. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 387 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (indicating that later case law has divided on whether tribal 
affiliation or tribal land ownership is more important to the Montana analysis). 
 68. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-67. 
 69. 532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001).  
 70. Id. at 648-49. 
 71. Id. at 647-48. 
 72. Id. at 648-49. 
 73. Id. at 654-57. 
 74. Id. at 656. 
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ignor[ing] the dependent status of Indian tribes and subvert[ing] the 
territorial restriction upon tribal power.”75 A non-Indian forming a 
“consensual relationship in one area . . . is not ‘in for a penny, in for a 
Pound.’”76 
Ultimately, the Court reasoned, the tribe lacked regulatory jurisdiction 
for the tax upon hotel guests because the relationship it sought to regulate 
was that of the non-tribal hotelier and his non-tribal guests, so there was no 
nexus between the tax and any consensual tribal relationship.77 
The Strate decision also served a limiting function, restricting Montana’s 
Self-Governance Exception to a similar form of specific jurisdiction.78 
Strate held that federal courts should uphold tribal civil jurisdiction over 
non-Indians under the Self-Governance Exception only where tribal 
jurisdiction is “necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control 
internal relations.”79 In Strate, non-tribal motorist Gisela Fredericks sued in 
tribal court for claims related to an automobile collision on a state highway 
right-of-way running through tribal-owned land on the Three Affiliated 
Tribes’ reservation.80 Fredericks’s passenger vehicle collided with a 
commercial gravel truck driven by a non-tribal employee of non-tribal 
business A-1 Contractors, headquartered off reservation.81 At the time of 
the collision, however, A-1 was the landscaping subcontractor for tribal 
LCM Corporation’s tribal building project located on reservation.82  
Fredericks sued in tribal court, and named the gravel truck driver and A-
1 Contractors as defendants.83 Prior to exhausting all appeals, A-1 and its 
driver sued in federal court seeking to enjoin the tribal court from 
continuing the suit for want of jurisdiction.84 Upon appeal, the Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 75. Id. at 655. 
 76. Id. at 656. 
 77. See id. at 656-57. 
 78. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 n.8 (2001) (indicating Strate provides for 
specific subject-matter jurisdiction). But see id. at 403 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(indicating that Strate provides for specific personal jurisdiction). 
 79. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997); Montana v. United States, 450 
U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (articulating a second exception providing for tribes’ “retain[ed] 
inherent . . . civil authority” with respect to non-tribal parties on non-tribal land within the 
reservation “when [their] conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe”). 
 80. Strate, 520 U.S. at 442-43. 
 81. Id. at 443. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 443-44 (explaining that Fredericks’ five Indian children also sued the same 
defendants for loss of consortium). 
 84. Id. at 444. 
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Court granted that injunction,85 reasoning that tribes generally may not 
exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, except as provided for in 
statutes or treaties.86 Alternatively, where statutes and treaties are silent on 
the matter, Montana’s exceptions may grant tribal civil jurisdiction over 
non-Indians.87 But, with respect to Montana’s Self-Governance Exception, 
the rationale for the exception is defeated where a non-tribal party’s suit-
inducing conduct occurred on non-tribal land.88  
Thus, in Strate, the federal government’s grant to the state of a right-of-
way to build the state highway effectively changed the character of the 
once-tribal land to non-tribal for questions of tribal civil jurisdiction 
because the Three Affiliated Tribes were largely stripped of their “right to 
exercise dominion or control” over the land.89  
In analyzing the Montana exceptions, the Court in Strate quickly 
dismissed the Consensual Relationship Exception largely because the Three 
Affiliated Tribes had no relationship to the crash, though it devoted more 
analysis to the Self-Governance Exception.90 In looking for a threat to the 
tribes’ “political integrity, . . . economic security, or . . . health or welfare,” 
the Court required more than a generalized reckless driving threat to “all in 
the vicinity.”91 Rather, under the Self-Governance Exception, perceived 
threats to retained tribal sovereignty give rise to tribal civil jurisdiction only 
where such jurisdiction is “necessary to protect tribal self-government or to 
                                                                                                             
 85. Id. at 444-45. 
 86. Id. at 445 (“[A]bsent express authorization by federal statute or treaty, tribal 
jurisdiction over the conduct of nonmembers exists only in limited circumstances.”).  
 87. Id. at 446 (“The Montana opinion added . . . that in certain circumstances, even 
where Congress has not expressly authorized it, tribal civil jurisdiction may encompass 
nonmembers.”); id. at 449 (“As the Court made plain in Montana, the general rule and 
exceptions there announced govern only in the absence of a delegation of tribal authority by 
treaty or statute.”). 
 88. See id. at 456 (indicating that where the situs of the suit-inducing conduct is located 
upon a state’s right-of-way, being land “alienated to non-Indians,” the tribe lacks “a 
landowner’s right to occupy and exclude” and therefore has no interest in self-governance on 
that land); id. at 459 (“Neither regulatory nor adjudicatory authority over the state highway 
accident at issue is needed to preserve ‘the right of reservation Indians to make their own 
laws and be ruled by them.’ . . . The Montana rule, therefore, and not its exceptions, applies 
to this case.”) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)). 
 89. Id. at 455; see also id. at 456 (“Tribe’s loss of ‘right of absolute and exclusive use 
and occupation . . . implies the loss of regulatory jurisdiction over the use of the land by 
others.’” (quoting South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689 (1993)); New Mexico v. 
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983). 
 90. Strate, 520 U.S. at 456-57. 
 91. Id. at 457-58. 
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control internal relations.”92 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held the tribal 
court need not hear Fredericks’s traffic collision suit to defend the Three 
Affiliated Tribes’ self-governance, reasoning that hauling the non-tribal 
defendants into “an unfamiliar court” fails to stem any of the threats 
identified by the Self-Governance Exception.93 
 III. Problems 
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, “hard cases . . . make bad 
law.”94 Unfortunately, the doctrine of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-tribal 
parties has developed almost exclusively from hard cases; Nevada v. Hicks 
was, perhaps, the hardest. Although the Court in Hicks tried to guard 
against bad law in this factually unusual case, limiting its holding “to the 
question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state 
law,”95 Hicks’s heavily fractured Court still manages to confuse an already 
convoluted canon of tribal civil jurisdiction.96 Hicks produced a six-justice 
majority, though four of the justices who signed the majority opinion also 
filed or signed concurrences.97  
Hicks’s confounding effect is especially pronounced considering the 
displacement of five of the nine justices who heard the 2001 case.98 Now, 
                                                                                                             
 92. See id. at 459. 
 93. Id.; see also id. at 459 n.13 (analogizing to the rule of federal civil procedure that 
“when nonresidents are the sole defendants in a suit filed in state court, the defendants 
ordinarily may remove the case to federal court” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012)). 
 94. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 95. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 n.2 (2001). But see id. at 376 (“[A]lthough the 
holding in this case is ‘limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers 
enforcing state law,’ one rule independently supporting that holding . . . is not so confined.”) 
(quoting id. at 358 n.2) (Souter, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 96. See id. at 376 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioners at 16) 
(“Petitioners are certainly correct that ‘[t]ribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers 
is . . . ill-defined,’ since this Court’s own pronouncements on the issue have pointed in 
seemingly opposite directions.”) (citation omitted); id. at 387 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (“[W]e have equivocated . . . in the past” on whether 
“Montana v. United States governs a tribe’s civil jurisdiction over nonmembers regardless of 
land ownership.”). 
 97. See generally id. at 375-404 (listing a concurrence by Souter, joined by two justices; 
a concurrence by Ginsburg; a concurrence by O’Connor, joined by two justices; and a 
concurrence by Stevens, joined by one justice). 
 98. See Robert Barnes & Gail Sullivan, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia Dies at 79, 
THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-
court-justice-antonin-scalia-dies-at-79/2016/02/13/effe8184-a62f-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf3 
9c_story.html (documenting Justice Antonin Scalia’s death); Charles Babington & Peter Baker, 
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only three of the justices who signed the Hicks majority remain after the 
death of Justice Scalia, who delivered the opinion of the court, and the 
replacements of Justices Rehnquist and Souter.99 Furthermore, speculation 
continues regarding the retirement of Justice Ginsburg, who likewise signed 
the Hicks majority opinion.100 In light of this significant change in the 
Court’s composition, it has become much more difficult to predict the 
Court’s sentiments on the contentious, unsettled, and convoluted issue of 
tribal civil jurisdiction. 
Unfortunately, the uncertainty is not without consequences, and these 
consequences are of larger magnitude than mere frustration. Theoretical and 
anecdotal evidence from the fields of financial economics,101 business 
strategy,102 and even Supreme Court precedent103 suggest a correlation 
                                                                                                             
Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Justice, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2005), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/29/AR2005092900859.html (identifying 
Chief Justice John Roberts as the replacement for deceased Chief Justice William Rehnquist); 
Laura Litvan, Kagan to Be Sworn in as 112th Court Justice Tomorrow, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS 
(Aug. 6, 2010, 1:47 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-08-05/kagan-is-
confirmed-by-senate-as-obama-s-second-appointee-to-supreme-court (identifying current Justice 
Elena Kagan as the replacement for retired Justice John Paul Stevens); Charlie Savage, Sotomayor 
Confirmed by Senate, 68-31, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/08/07/us/politics/07confirm.html?_r=0 (identifying current Justice Sonia Sotomayor as the 
replacement for retired Justice David Souter); David Stout, Alito Is Sworn in as Justice After 58-
42 Vote to Confirm Him, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/31/ 
politics/politicsspecial1/31cnd-alito.html?_r=0 (identifying current Justice Samuel Alito as the 
replacement for former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor). 
 99. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 354. 
 100. See id.; Greg Stohr, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Has Stent Implanted, Supreme Court 
Says, BLOOMBERGPOLITICS (Nov. 26, 2014, 9:25 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/ 
articles/2014-11-26/justice-ginsburg-has-stent-implanted-us-supreme-court-says (explaining 
that Ginsburg received a heart stent in November 2014 and has been battling cancer for more 
than a decade but “has no plans to retire anytime soon,” although some have suggested the 
then-eighty-one-year-old “leader of [the Court’s] liberal wing” should tender her retirement 
prior to the expiration of Barack Obama’s presidential term in 2017). 
 101. See, e.g., Bruno Solnik & Luo Zuo, A Global Equilibrium Asset Pricing Model with 
Home Preference, 58 MGMT. SCI. 273, 273 (2012) (discussing risk aversion theory); ZVI 
BODIE ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF INVESTMENTS 190 (Brent Gordon et al. eds., 8th ed., 2010) 
(discussing the risk-return relationship under the capital asset pricing model); see also Ralph 
J. Brown & Scott Selk, Economic Trends on the American Indian Reservation in South 
Dakota, S.D. BUS. REV., June 2003, at 1, 13-14 (discussing the role of tribal governance and 
law in hindering economic development); infra Section III.C. 
 102. See, e.g., HOSKISSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 288 (discussing the relationship 
between political risk and “direct foreign investment”); see also infra Section III.C. 
 103. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 321-
22 (2008) (describing a bank’s decision to offer less favorable financing or leasing terms to a 
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between tribal Jurisdictional Risk and the avoidance of non-tribal 
investment in Indian Country. As will be explored in subsections (B)-(C), 
perhaps this effect contributed to the bank’s express recognition of 
“possible jurisdictional problems” and its allegedly favorable lending to 
non-tribal borrowers in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and 
Cattle Co.104 
Therefore, considering that “Native Americans suffer higher rates of . . . 
[general socioeconomic] ills than . . . any other group in the United 
States”105—owing partially to their struggle “to engage . . . outside 
investors in economic activities”106—confusion in the doctrine of tribal 
civil jurisdiction remains a very sizable problem. 
A. As Exemplified in Nevada v. Hicks, the Current Canon of Tribal Civil 
Jurisdiction Is Rampant with Uncertainty and Inconsistency 
There is no easy way to analyze Hicks—a fifty-one-page, four-
concurrence, factually bizarre case filled with legal obscurities. This 
comment aims merely to extract the case’s most generalized propositions, 
and especially those that apply to the nexus of tribal civil procedure and 
non-tribal investment.  
In Hicks, as part of the investigation of the off-reservation slaying of a 
bighorn sheep, a Nevada game warden, suspecting an Indian named Hicks, 
twice acquired from a Nevada court a search warrant and twice received 
approval from the Fallon Tribal Court to execute the warrant.107 Neither 
search produced evidence that Hicks had slain a bighorn.108 In response to 
the second search, Hicks filed suit in the Fallon Tribal Court against 
multiple parties, claiming property damage and an improper search.109 The 
only claims reviewed by the United States Supreme Court were those 
                                                                                                             
tribal-owned, on-reservation company due to concerns about tribal civil jurisdiction); see 
also infra Section III.C; cf. Brief for South Dakota Bankers Ass’n as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 5-6, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, No. 13-
1496 (U.S. July 18, 2014) (“The non-conformity and uncertainty with how courts are 
interpreting Montana and its exceptions is discouraging to nonmembers and off-reservation 
businesses wishing to explore markets on Indian reservations. . . . [B]usinesses . . . limit the 
amount of business they do on-reservations . . . because the risk associated with not knowing 
the rules before the game begins simply outweighs the potential economic benefit.”). 
 104. 554 U.S. at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 105. 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(8) (2012). 
 106. Id. § 4301(a)(7). 
 107. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 355-56. 
 108. Id. at 356. 
 109. Id. 
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against the state of Nevada and the state wardens involved in the 
searches.110  
The wardens appealed to the Supreme Court on claims arising under 
tribal tort law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983—claims filed against the wardens in 
their official capacities—arguing that the tribal court had no jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the claims.111 In analyzing the tribal tort law claims, Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected the tribal court’s regulatory 
jurisdiction over the tribal tort law claims on a tribal-state sovereignty 
balancing theory,112 but the doctrinal take-away from this component of the 
analysis is the clarification that Montana’s “general rule”—a presumption 
against tribal civil jurisdiction over non-tribal parties—applies regardless of 
whether land is Indian-owned.113 As such, land “ownership status . . . is 
only one factor to consider in determining whether [Indian] regulation [of 
non-Indians] . . . is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control 
internal relations’” under the Self-Governance Exception to the general 
rule.114 Land identity can, however, be “dispositive” to the self-governance 
inquiry—indeed, it is near certain that tribal civil jurisdiction will not be 
upheld where the land is non-Indian owned.115 The factor of land ownership 
is, however, less compelling—and the question of tribal civil jurisdiction is 
less certain—where the transaction occurs on Indian-owned land, because 
Indian land ownership does not automatically create regulatory jurisdiction 
with respect to the conduct of non-Indians on that land.116 
With respect to the § 1983 claims, the majority again held the tribal court 
lacked adjudicatory authority, reasoning that unlike state courts, tribal 
courts are not courts of general jurisdiction.117 State courts’ general 
                                                                                                             
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 356-57. 
 112. Id. at 361. 
 113. Id. at 359-60. 
 114. Id.; Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (providing for tribes’ 
“retain[ed] inherent . . . civil authority” with respect to non-tribal parties on non-tribal land 
within the reservation “when [their] conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the 
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe”). 
 115. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360. But see Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of 
Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 443-44, 458-59 (1989) (opinions of Stevens, J., and 
Blackmun, J.) (allowing tribal regulatory jurisdiction over non-tribal parcel enclosed within 
the reservation). 
 116. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360 (citing Brendale, 492 U.S. at 443-44, 458-59 (1989) 
(opinions of Stevens, J., and Blackmun, J.)). 
 117. Id. at 366, 374. But see id. at 403 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Given a tribal assertion 
of general subject-matter jurisdiction, we should recognize a tribe’s authority to adjudicate 
claims arising under § 1983 unless federal law dictates otherwise.”). 
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jurisdiction stems from their historically-retained “inherent authority” under 
federal-state sovereignty and from positive empowerment to “enforce 
federal law . . . presumed by Article III of the Constitution.”118 Given that 
tribal courts lack both “historical and constitutional assumption[s] of 
concurrent state-court jurisdiction over federal-law,” the majority reasoned 
that tribal courts must be courts of limited jurisdiction.119 As courts of 
limited jurisdiction, tribal courts’ “inherent adjudicative jurisdiction over 
nonmembers is at most only as broad as its legislative jurisdiction.”120 
Thus, tribal courts have no jurisdiction over federal law claims “absent 
congressional specification to the contrary.”121 Ultimately, the majority held 
that in the absence of any positive legislation authorizing the tribe to 
adjudicate § 1983 claims, these did not fall within the tribal court’s 
jurisdiction.122 
Thus, having rejected tribal court jurisdiction over all claims, the 
majority reversed and held in favor of the state wardens.123 
1. The Court Cannot Agree on the Role of Land in the Jurisdictional 
Analysis 
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor appeared concerned with the future 
application of the Montana doctrine, which was the “best source of 
‘coherence in the various manifestations of the general law of tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians’”124—despite the fact that Montana itself was 
somewhat incoherent.125 Specifically, O’Connor objected to the majority’s 
deviation from the Montana doctrine in giving the factor of tribal land 
ownership short shrift.126 The majority’s rationale broke from precedent, 
she argued, by quickly dismissing “the fact that the state officials’ 
                                                                                                             
 118. Id. at 366-67 (citing Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). 
 119. Id. at 367. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. at 366-67. 
 122. See id. at 367-68. 
 123. Id. at 375. 
 124. Id. at 388 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(quoting Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (Souter, J., concurring)). 
 125. Id. at 387 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(“Montana . . . was not clear whether the status of the persons being regulated, or the status 
of the land . . . led the Court to develop Montana’s jurisdictional rule . . . .”).  
 126. See id. at 388, 392 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“The Court’s reasoning suffers from . . . giv[ing] only passing consideration to 
the fact that the state officials’ activities in this case occurred on land owned . . . by the 
Tribes . . . .”). 
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activities . . . occurred on land owned and controlled by the Tribes,” 
“giv[ing only] a passing nod to land status.”127 The majority’s analysis of 
such an important factor, she argued, was insufficient given a history of 
Court “equivocat[ion]” and thus demonstrated a large “oversight.”128  
Whereas the majority would apply the Montana presumption against 
tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians regardless of land status,129 Justice 
O’Connor, invoking the Self-Governance Exception,130 noted that threats to 
the tribes “are far more likely to be implicated where . . . the nonmember 
activity takes place on land owned and controlled by the tribe.”131  
However, even before the majority broke from the Montana line of 
precedent, the Court had previously been attempting to cope with 
“occup[ying] a middle ground between [its] cases that provide for nearly 
absolute tribal sovereignty over tribe members and our rule that tribes have 
no inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers.”132 Thus, Justice 
O’Connor argued, “If Montana is to bring coherence to our case law, we 
must apply it with due consideration to land status, which has always 
figured prominently in our analysis of tribal jurisdiction.”133 
Justice Souter’s concurrence, on the other hand, argued for eliminating 
land as a primary jurisdictional fact to prevent the creation of “an unstable 
jurisdictional crazy quilt” stemming from the fact that “land on Indian 
reservations constantly changes hands.”134 Such an effect is problematic, 
Justice Souter explains, because a jurisdictional rule relying primarily on 
land status “would prove extraordinarily difficult to administer and would 
provide little notice to nonmembers.”135 Rather, he argued, land ownership 
                                                                                                             
 127. Id. at 388, 392, 395 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  
 128. Id. at 387, 395 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 129. Id. at 359-60. 
 130. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (providing for tribes’ 
“retain[ed] inherent . . . civil authority” with respect to non-tribal parties on non-tribal land 
within the reservation “when [their] conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the 
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe”). 
 131. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 395 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 132. Id. at 391-92 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 133. Id. at 395 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 134. Id. at 383 (Souter, J., concurring); accord id. at 359-60 (indicating that the majority 
largely agreed with Justice Souter, though the majority was somewhat less explicit as to the 
role of land). 
 135. Id. at 383 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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“is relevant only insofar as it bears on the application of one of Montana’s 
exceptions.”136 
Notice to non-Indians of susceptibility to tribal civil jurisdiction is 
especially important due to “‘[t]he special nature of [Indian] tribunals’ . . . 
which differ from traditional American courts in a number of significant 
respects,”137 including differences in parties’ fundamental procedural rights, 
court structure, applicable law, judicial independence, and availability of 
review.138 
Justice Souter first invoked case law to argue against making land a 
primary jurisdictional fact, stating that “[t]he [presumption against civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indians] on which Montana and Strate were 
decided . . . looks first to human relationships, not land records”—with “the 
membership status of the unconsenting party . . . [being] the primary 
jurisdictional fact”—“and it should make no difference per se whether acts 
committed on a reservation occurred on tribal land or on land owned by a 
nonmember.”139  
Justice Souter also referred to the history of tribal sovereignty and policy 
considerations.140 He reasoned that tribal authority over non-Indians has 
consistently remained “narrowly confined,” as demonstrated by treaties 
with the Five Civilized Tribes expressly “exclud[ing] jurisdiction over 
nonmembers”141 and federal statutes from the 1800s delegating to tribal 
courts jurisdiction over purely Indian disputes, while preserving in “the 
courts of the United States jurisdiction of all actions to which its own 
citizens are parties on either side.”142  
2. The Majority’s Inconsistent Treatment of Congressional Silence 
Creates Confusion 
Justices Stevens and Breyer also objected to the majority’s 
pronouncement that tribal courts are only courts of specific subject matter 
                                                                                                             
 136. Id. at 375-76 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 137. Id. at 383 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 
(1990)). 
 138. Id. at 383-85 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting, of strong significance, that “the Bill of 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment do not of their own force apply to Indian tribes”). 
 139. Id. at 381-82 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 140. Id. at 382 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 141. Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 
171, 171 n. 21 (1982) (dissenting opinion)). 
 142. Id. at 382-83 (Souter, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In 
re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 116 (1891)). 
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jurisdiction.143 While the majority assumed “that tribal courts do not have 
jurisdiction to hear federal claims,” such as § 1983 claims, absent federal 
congressional authorization,144 Justice Stevens would assume under 
congressional silence that “the question whether tribal courts are courts of 
general jurisdiction is fundamentally one of tribal law,” yielding generally 
to “tribal assertion of general subject-matter jurisdiction.”145 
Justice Stevens’s analysis was “not based upon any mystical attribute of 
sovereignty, as the majority suggests, but rather upon the simple, 
commonsense notion that it is the body creating a court that determines 
what sorts of claims that court will hear.”146 Justice Stevens further 
reasoned that “[n]ow and then silence is not pregnant” and that 
“[i]nadvertence seems the most likely [explanation]” for § 1983’s failure to 
mention its application in tribal courts.147 In the analogous application of § 
1983 in state courts the Court has merely assumed and “never questioned” 
state courts’ general jurisdiction “to provide the relief it authorizes.”148 
3. Hicks Buries Additional Layers of Confusion and Uncertainty in Terse 
Footnotes and Unanswered Questions 
The uncertainty in Hicks extends beyond direct conflicts between the 
majority and concurrences into oblique and minimally analyzed asides in 
the footnotes. In responding to Justice Stevens’s criticisms regarding the 
general jurisdiction of tribal courts, only in a footnote does the majority 
specify that “Strate’s limitation on jurisdiction over nonmembers pertains 
to subject-matter, rather than merely personal, jurisdiction.”149 Although 
this statement is binding law,150 the majority’s five-sentence footnote 
analysis of the issue creates substantial confusion considering that the 
                                                                                                             
 143. See generally id. at 366-69; id. at 401-04 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 144. Id. at 402 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 145. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 146. Id. at 403 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also id. (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“The questions whether that court has the power to compel anyone to listen to it 
and whether its assertion of subject-matter jurisdiction conflicts with some higher law are 
separate issues.”). 
 147. Id. at 404 (quoting El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 487 (1999)). 
 148. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 149. Id. at 367 n.8. 
 150. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 352 (Harvard 
Univ. Press ed., 2009) (indicating that footnotes are binding because “[t]he court’s holdings 
are authoritative wherever they appear on the page”). See generally Robert A. James, Are 
Footnotes in Opinions Given Full Precedential Effect?, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 267 (1999); Ira 
Brad Matetsky, The Footnote Argument—Sustained at Last?, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 33 (2002). 
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dichotomy of specific and general subject matter jurisdiction is typically 
addressed with respect to personal jurisdiction in the canon of federal civil 
jurisdiction.151 This confusion is compounded by the fact that many cases 
on tribal civil jurisdiction fail to mention the concepts of personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction altogether,152 leaving this dichotomy within 
tribal civil jurisdiction ambiguous throughout the U.S.—with the exception 
of the Ninth Circuit.153 
Justice Souter’s concurrence also inserts a footnote that would render the 
entire canon of tribal civil jurisdiction unintelligible if it were binding law, 
owing to the Court’s decades of loose language.154 Justice Souter 
recognized that the Montana Court used the terms “nonmembers” and 
“non-Indians” interchangeably155—a trend that has been largely replicated 
among Montana’s progeny. According to Justice Souter, “the relevant 
distinction, as we implicitly acknowledged in Strate, is between members 
and nonmembers of the tribe.”156 In his four-sentence footnote, Justice 
Souter failed to consider the linguistic implications of distinguishing the 
Court’s consistent muddling of “nonmember” and “non-Indian.” If Justice 
Souter’s footnote were to be binding law, it would raise an unanswerable 
                                                                                                             
 151. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (“Although the placement 
of a product into the stream of commerce ‘may bolster an affiliation germane to specific 
jurisdiction,’ . . . such contacts ‘do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the 
forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011)); see also Atkinson Trading 
Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001) (ruling that Montana’s consensual relationship 
exception provides merely specific regulatory jurisdiction over non-tribal parties operating 
on non-tribal land); Katosha Belvin Nakai, Red Rover, Red Rover: A Call for Comity in 
Linking Tribal and State Long-Arm Provisions for Service of Process in Indian Country, 35 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 633, 669 (2003) (“Hicks collapsed . . . the traditional subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction analysis.”). 
 152. See Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638, 642-43 (S.D. 1993) (“[A] review of the 
cases of the United States Supreme Court reveals that the analysis of jurisdictional issues 
between Indian and federal or state governments is rarely broken down into the traditional 
facets of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. . . . [T]his failure to analyze questions of 
tribal jurisdiction through jurisdiction’s traditional component parts does not promote clarity 
of jurisdictional analysis.”). See generally, e.g., Shirley, 532 U.S. 645; Montana v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (demonstrating the 
difficulty of untangling the issue of personal or subject matter jurisdiction).  
 153. See generally Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802 
(9th Cir. 2011); see also infra Section IV.A. 
 154. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 377 n.2 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 155. See id. (Souter, J., concurring). 
 156. See id. (Souter, J., concurring). 
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question: how should the Court untangle the linguistically imprecise, 
factually complex case law in new, also factually complex cases? 
Finally, Hicks recognized and declined to answer two important 
questions.157 The first of which was “the question of tribal-court jurisdiction 
over nonmember defendants in general”—for example, those not acting as 
state officials.158 The second, which was also important in answering the 
first question, was, “the question [of] whether a tribe’s adjudicative 
jurisdiction over nonmember defendants equals its legislative 
jurisdiction.”159 
B. The Current Canon Incentivizes Discrimination in Transactions  
Given the confusion of the doctrine of tribal civil jurisdiction as 
exemplified by Hicks, it is not surprising that Investors have subsequently 
sought to avoid subjecting themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction altogether. 
Indeed, the problem is most clearly illustrated by Plains Commerce Bank v. 
Long Family Land and Cattle Co., which also illustrates that Jurisdictional 
Risk may cause allegedly discriminatory effects in transactions to the 
detriment of Native Americans. 
1. Plains Commerce Illustrates Alleged Transactional Discrimination 
Against Native Americans for the Purpose of Avoiding Tribal 
Jurisdiction and Shifting Economic Costs 
Doctrinally, Plains Commerce stands for the proposition that neither 
Montana exception can permit tribal regulation of non-Indian land sales 
because the regulations cover only non-tribal “conduct,” from which the 
Supreme Court distinguished non-tribal land sales.160 However, Plains 
                                                                                                             
 157. See id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“I write separately only to emphasize that 
Strate v. A-1 Contractors . . . similarly deferred larger issues . . . [W]e ‘express[ed] no view 
on the governing law or proper forum’ for cases arising out of nonmember conduct on tribal 
land. The Court’s opinion . . . does not reach out definitively to answer the[se] jurisdictional 
questions left open . . . .”) (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997)) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 158. Id. at 358 n.2; see also id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (explaining that the 
court also declined to decide this jurisdictional question as it relates to “state officials 
engaged on tribal land in a venture or frolic of their own”); id. at 396 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The Court . . . never explains where 
these, or more serious allegations involving a breach of authority, would fall within its new 
rule of state official immunity.”). 
 159. Id. at 358, 374 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 160. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 340-41. 
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Commerce is most significant in that it illustrates a correlation between 
Jurisdictional Risk and Investor avoidance of Indian Country. 
In this 2008 case before the Supreme Court, the Sioux majority 
shareholders of Long Family Land and Cattle Company sued Plains 
Commerce Bank, alleging that the bank offered better terms to non-tribal 
customers in lending and land transactions.161 The tribal shareholders 
claimed the bank explained its favoritism toward non-tribal borrowers as 
resulting from the risk of “‘possible jurisdictional problems’ that might 
have been caused by the Bank financing an ‘Indian owned entity on the 
reservation.’”162  
The conflict arose out of a nearly twenty-year commercial relationship 
between the bank and the Long’s family corporation located on the 
Cheyenne River Sioux reservation on land alienated from the tribe, 
although the relationship began with the corporation’s former, non-tribal 
owner.163 The opinion suggests that the majority ownership of the Long 
corporation shifted from non-tribal to tribal prior to or as a result of the 
prior non-tribal owner’s 1995 death.164 The corporation and the decedent’s 
son, now serving with his wife as majority shareholders, were indebted 
$750,000 to the bank, and the Long Company’s performance was 
“flagging,” so the new majority shareholders sought refinancing.165  
The Long family did refinance, and achieved a new loan contract and 
lease agreement.166 In connection with the new loan, the shareholders 
avoided foreclosure and achieved partial debt cancellation, but 
unfortunately at a cost of transferring 2,230 mortgaged acres to the bank.167 
The bank subsequently leased this acreage back to the Long Company for a 
period of two years, including a repurchase option with an exercise price of 
$468,000.168 This less-optimal lease came only after the bank, fearing 
Jurisdictional Risk, rescinded its original offer to “sell the land back . . . 
with a 20-year contract for deed.”169  
Less than a year after signing, a severe winter caused the deaths of 
hundreds of Long cattle, and the ranch could not afford to repurchase the 
                                                                                                             
 161. Id. at 320. 
 162. Id. at 322. 
 163. Id. at 320-21, 340. 
 164. Id. at 321. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 322. 
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acreage by the end of the two-year lease.170 Subsequently, the bank sold the 
land to non-Indians under unspecified terms the Longs claimed were more 
favorable.171 
The Longs sued in tribal court, and the bank sought summary judgment, 
arguing against tribal court jurisdiction.172 The tribal court denied summary 
judgment, ultimately awarding the Longs $750,000 and a repurchase option 
for 960 acres.173  
Having exhausted tribal appeals, the bank sought a federal court 
judgment declaring a lack of tribal jurisdiction.174 After the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed the federal district court’s judgments in favor of the ranch, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.175  
The Supreme Court reasoned that the Longs’ suit was “an attempt to 
regulate the terms on which the Bank may sell the land it owns” and held 
that the tribal court lacked regulatory jurisdiction.176 Regulatory jurisdiction 
was lacking because the land had been alienated from the tribe, depriving 
the tribal court of retained inherent authority, and neither Montana 
exception applied.177  
Both Montana exceptions, “stem[ming] from the same sovereign 
interests . . . do not reach to regulating the sale of non-Indian fee land” 
because, the Court ruled, the exceptions merely permit (in specific 
circumstances) tribal regulation of non-tribal “conduct,” to be distinguished 
from non-tribal “sale[s] of land.”178 Unlike regulation of conduct, such as 
barring entry to tribal land or taxing specific actions, the regulation of non-
tribal land transfers is not empowered by tribal sovereignty because any 
damage to tribal “political integrity,” under the Montana analysis, occurred 
with the original transfer to a non-tribal party.179 
Reasoning that the tribal court could have no adjudicatory jurisdiction in 
the absence of regulatory jurisdiction, the Court reversed, nullifying the 
Longs’ tribal court judgment.180 
                                                                                                             
 170. Id. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 322-23. 
 174. Id. at 323. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. at 330, 340. 
 177. See id. at 339-41. 
 178. Id. at 340-41. 
 179. Id. at 335-36 (“Resale, by itself, causes no additional damage.”). 
 180. Id. at 330, 342. 
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2. All Plains Commerce Justices Agree That Current Law on Tribal Civil 
Jurisdiction Condones Transactional Discrimination Against Native 
Americans 
Admittedly, the Longs appear to have been high-risk debtors, given 
substantial outstanding debt, an assumed lack of extensive experience 
managing their newly owned company, and an apparent lack of livestock 
insurance. Therefore, it would only be rational—and acceptably ethical—
for a lending institution to extend less favorable lending terms or to be 
highly conservative in structuring a leasing agreement that appears to be at 
least partially motivated to rescue the Longs from a looming foreclosure. 
A separate opinion signed by four justices, however, emphasized the 
unacceptability of considering the Longs’ tribal affiliation as a factor in 
imposing less favorable terms. In this opinion, Justice Ginsburg criticized 
the Plains Commerce majority’s failure to uphold the tribe’s “authority to 
shield its members against discrimination by those engaging in on-
reservation commercial relationships” when this same authority has been 
granted to federal, state, and local governments.181 
The very fact that questions of tribal civil jurisdiction consider tribal 
affiliation—a close proxy for race—as a factor seems problematic under 
many modern understandings of equal protection.182 If the current canon of 
tribal civil jurisdiction were to receive a constitutional challenge—
especially considering early policies of tribal assimilation183—a well-pled 
                                                                                                             
 181. Id. at 348-49 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (5-4 decision); see, 
e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-49) (effective Jan. 
21, 2013) (“It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with 
respect to any aspect of a credit transaction . . . on the basis of race . . . .”). 
 182. Compare Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 496 (2000) (indicating that “[a]ncestry 
can be a proxy for race” and that “racial discrimination is that which singles out ‘identifiable 
classes of persons . . . solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics’”) (quoting 
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987)), with United States v. 
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977) (“The decisions of this Court leave no doubt that federal 
legislation with respect to Indian tribes, although relating to Indians as such, is not based 
upon impermissible racial classifications. . . . Legislation with respect to these ‘unique 
aggregations’ has repeatedly been sustained by this Court against claims of unlawful racial 
discrimination.”); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 n.24 (1974) (holding that a 
Bureau of Indian Affairs employment preference for tribal members “does not constitute 
‘racial discrimination’” because it “is political rather than racial in nature”). 
 183. See generally Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959). 
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claim highlighting the quasi-racial classification could potentially trigger 
strict scrutiny.184  
Although the tribal jurisdictional factor of parties’ tribal affiliations 
smacks of “separate but equal” justice,185 the Plains Commerce majority, 
responding to Justice Ginsburg’s separate opinion, writes that “[t]he 
sovereign authority of Indian tribes is limited in ways state and federal 
authority is not . . . [and] that bedrock principle does not vary depending on 
the desirability of a particular regulation.”186 Thus, the majority adopted a 
formalist approach, but this statement gives credence to Justice Ginsburg’s 
normative concerns.187 
Considering that both Plains Commerce opinions—or all nine justices—
recognized the desirability of avoiding discrimination against Indians in 
transactions with non-tribal parties, perhaps the legislature should take 
advantage of its ability to modify the law of tribal civil jurisdiction to 
                                                                                                             
 184. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. . . . [C]ourts 
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes 
justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”); United States v. 
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938) (suggesting without deciding that 
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition . . . which may 
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”). But see, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 
533 U.S. 353, 383-84 (2001) (stating that “the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment 
do not of their own force apply to Indian tribes. . . . Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of 
1968 (ICRA) makes a handful of analogous safeguards”—including equal protection—
though ICRA’s equal protection is not closely moored to federal precedent); Hayden v. 
County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d. Cir. 1999) (citing multiple Supreme Court 
precedents to articulate an equal protection framework specifying that “a law . . . is 
discriminatory on its face if it expressly classifies persons on the basis of race,” “a law 
which is facially neutral violates equal protection if . . . applied in a discriminatory fashion,” 
and, alternatively, “a facially neutral statute violates equal protection if . . . motivated by 
discriminatory animus and its application results in a discriminatory effect”). 
 185. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“Separate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs . . . are, by reason of the 
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 186. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 340. 
 187. See, e.g., id. at 348-49 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“The 
Federal Government and every State, county, and municipality can make nondiscrimination 
the law governing contracts generally, and real property transactions in particular. . . . Why 
should the Tribe lack comparable authority to shield its members against discrimination by 
those engaging in on-reservation commercial relationships—including land-secured 
lending—with them?”). 
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further this policy goal.188 Such a legislative response should consider the 
interests of individual Indians in fair transactions and the tribes’ interests in 
sovereignty and self-governance, which includes the judicial shaping of 
their own tribal business law. Furthermore, the financial literature suggests 
that the legislature should also consider the interests of Investors in 
applying appropriate transactional risk premiums and strategies for 
reducing risk to enhance the flow of capital to Indian Country. 
C. The Current Canon’s Uncertainty Discourages Non-Tribal Investment in 
Tribal Economies 
Uncertainty in tribal civil jurisdiction such as that caused by Hicks is 
extremely discouraging to Investors. Indeed, given the existence of 
Jurisdictional Risk, Investor reluctance to invest in the tribes can be 
explained on two theoretical bases.  
First, as an initial matter, investors display “home bias,” a psychological 
preference for investing in domestic assets.189 The bias is so strong that 
investors often forgo “gains to be made from international portfolio 
diversification in terms of pure risk reduction” as compared to investments 
in “purely national portfolios.”190 Therefore, even given an ideal legal 
structure, tribes would have to overcome this sometimes-irrational impulse 
to avoid cross-border transfers of capital. 
                                                                                                             
 188. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17 (1987) (“Congress undoubtedly 
has the power to limit tribal court jurisdiction . . . .”); Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow 
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985) (“[T]he power of the Federal Government over 
the Indian tribes is plenary.”); Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission 
Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 787 n.30 (1984) (“[I]t is clear that all aspects of Indian sovereignty 
are subject to defeasance by Congress . . . .”); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 562 
(1981) (“If Congress had wished to extend tribal jurisdiction [over hunting and fishing] to 
lands owned by non-Indians, it could easily have done so by incorporating in [18 U.S.C.] § 
1165 the definition of ‘Indian country’ in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 . . . .”). 
 189. See Solnik & Zuo, supra note 101, at 273 (“[I]nvestors suffer from foreign aversion, 
a preference for home assets based on familiarity. . . . Foreign aversion . . . leads investors to 
underinvest in foreign stocks in order to reduce the potential for regret, thereby creating a 
home bias.”); BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 614 (“[I]nvestor portfolios notoriously 
overweight home-country stocks . . . and underweight, or even completely ignore, foreign 
equities.”). Other scholars find that home bias occurs even domestically. See Joshua D. 
Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz, Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic 
Portfolios, 54 J. FIN. 2045, 2048 (1999) (“[A]s much as one-third of the home bias puzzle 
may only be a feature of a geographic proximity preference and the relative scale of the 
world economy, rather than a consequence of national borders.”). 
 190. See, e.g., Linda L. Tesar & Ingrid M. Werner, Home Bias and High Turnover, 14 J. 
INT’L MONEY & FIN. 467, 478 (1995). 
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Second, Plains Commerce Bank offers anecdotal evidence suggesting 
that Investors consider Jurisdictional Risk, assess risk premiums, and 
generally try to avoid subjecting themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction in 
capital-transferring activities.191 The fact that the non-tribal bank in Plains 
Commerce substituted its original financing terms to tribal parties for 
drastically less favorable financing terms—assessing a heavy risk 
premium—then ultimately chose to deal instead with non-tribal parties “on 
more favorable terms” strongly suggests that Investors consider 
Jurisdictional Risk to be a priced risk.192 
As indicated by asset pricing models derived from the Nobel Prize-
winning Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM),193 “priced risk factors” 
include any “uncertainties that might concern a large segment of 
investors. . . sufficiently that they will demand meaningful risk premiums to 
bear exposure to those sources of risk.”194 
                                                                                                             
 191. See infra Section II.B.  
 192. See generally Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 349 (recounting a non-tribal 
bank’s interactions with tribal parties in rescinding an original offer of a “20-year contract 
for deed” in favor of “a two-year lease with an option to purchase” upon contemplating 
“possible jurisdictional problems”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
Additional evidence may be found in SEC periodic filings. Regulation S-K requires 
securities issuers to disclose in 10-K periodic filings, under the heading “Risk Factors,” “a 
discussion of the most significant factors that make the [securities] offering speculative or 
risky.” See 17 C.F.R. 229.503(c) (2011). At least one issuer has found Jurisdictional Risk 
sufficiently risky that it felt compelled to disclose it in its 10-K filing. See, e.g., Cash Sys., 
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 8-9 (Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/861050/000095012408001688/v39158e10vk.htm#103 (indicating that the company is 
“subject to . . . political risk associated with the majority of [its] customers being Native 
American, Sovereign Nations,” pointing to, inter alia, the fact that “Tribes . . . may 
determine their own . . . dispute processes” with few “limitation[s] on . . . Tribal 
jurisdiction”). 
 193. Press Release, Nobelprize.org, This Year’s Laureates Are Pioneers in the Theory of 
Financial Economics and Corporate Finance (Oct. 16, 1990), http://www.nobelprize.org/ 
nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1990/press.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) 
(indicating that Professor William Sharpe was a co-recipient of the 1990 Nobel Prize in 
Economic Sciences for his “pioneering” research that spawned the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model). Modern scholars indicate that forms of absolute asset pricing, such as the CAPM, 
can be universally used to “value a bundle of cashflows (dividends, coupons and principle, 
option payoffs, firm profits, etc) based on its exposure to fundamental sources of 
macroeconomic risk.” John H. Cochrane & Christopher L. Culp, Equilibrium Asset Pricing 
and Discount Factors: Overview and Implications for Derivatives Valuation and Risk 
Management, in MODERN RISK MANAGEMENT: A HISTORY 57, 58 (Sarah Jenkins & Tamsin 
Kennedy eds., 2003). 
 194. BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 212 (emphasis omitted). 
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However, priced risk is unfortunately a nuanced and developing concept 
within the financial literature. An informed discussion thereof thus requires 
background in the theory of the underlying CAPM.195 Generally speaking, 
the CAPM aims to “predict[] the relationship between the risk and 
equilibrium expected returns on risky assets.”196 However, the CAPM 
assumes that “[a]ll investors . . . are rational mean-variance 
optimizers”197—that is, that all investors perform “the right kind of 
diversification for the right reason.”198  
Diversification can be generally understood as an application of the 
“age-old . . . adage ‘don’t put all your eggs in one basket.’”199 To simplify, 
efficient diversification requires investing “across industries because firms 
in different industries . . . have lower covariances200 than firms within an 
industry.”201 Or, more generally, when an investor “diversifies across 
different financial assets with different risk characteristics, [that investor] 
can reduce the total amount of risk faced.”202  
By diversifying their investments, investors can virtually eliminate a 
component of total investment risk called nonsystematic, or firm-specific, 
risk.203 These risks are “those . . . that affect a particular security only, 
leaving all others untouched.”204 Because the CAPM assumes that investors 
                                                                                                             
 195. See Cochrane & Culp, supra note 193, at 87 (“[A] sound grasp of asset pricing 
theory is required to define systematic risk.”). 
 196. BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 190.  
 197. Id.  
 198. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 79, 89 (1952) (discussing the 
“expected returns-variance of returns . . . rule”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
id. at 89 (indicating that “risk” and “variance of return” are generally interchangeable terms); 
BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 114 (explaining that “expected return” and “mean return” 
are interchangeable terms). 
 199. BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 145. 
 200. “Covariance” refers to “the fundamental measure of association between two 
random variables.” Covariance, 1 THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
METHODS (1st ed. 2004). 
 201. Markowitz, supra note 198, at 89. 
 202. WILLIAM J. CARNEY, CORPORATE FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 122 (Robert 
C. Clark et al. eds., 3d ed., 2015). 
 203. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 193, 205 (using “nonsystematic risk” 
interchangeably with “firm-specific risk” and “diversifiable risk”). “Nonsystematic risk” is 
also interchangeable with the term “idiosyncratic risk.” See, e.g., Cochrane & Culp, supra 
note 193, at 65. 
 204. Cochrane & Culp, supra note 193, at 67 (identifying as “approximat[e]” examples 
of nonsystematic risk “operational and liquidity risk, as well as those components of market 
and credit risk that are unique to the firm in question”). 
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rationally diversify their portfolios to eliminate nonsystematic risk,205 an 
asset’s nonsystematic risk does not necessitate application of a risk 
premium.206 
However, under the CAPM’s “expected return-beta relationship,” 
investors must receive “risk premiums . . . proportional to beta,”207 a Greek 
letter used in the financial literature to represent systematic risk.208 Unlike 
nonsystematic risk, systematic risk cannot be eliminated by diversification, 
which is why investors demand compensation therefor.209 
Unfortunately, the financial literature has not reached a firm consensus 
on what constitutes systematic risk.210 The foundational CAPM model, 
published by Professor William Sharpe in 1964,211 assumed that systematic 
risk is comprised solely of one risk: “the extent to which returns on [a] 
stock respond to the returns of the market portfolio,” a theoretical portfolio 
“which includes all assets of the security universe.”212 Subsequent financial 
research has concluded that Sharpe’s “beta does not tell the whole story of 
risk.”213 Rather, more contemporary studies suggest that there are “risk 
factors that affect security returns beyond beta’s one-dimensional 
measurement of market sensitivity.”214 
                                                                                                             
 205. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 190. 
 206. Id. at 193; see also Cochrane & Culp, supra note 193, at 65 (“Idiosyncratic risks are 
‘not priced’, meaning that you earn no more than the interest rate for holding them.”). 
 207. BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 193. 
 208. See id. at 194.  
 209. See id. at 193. 
 210. See generally id.at 205-07 (documenting contemporary challenges to the CAPM’s 
beta, a “one-dimensional measurement of market sensitivity”); see also id. at 209 (indicating 
that, under multifactor asset pricing models, it is “challeng[ing] . . . to identify the 
empirically important [systematic risk] factors”); id. at 212 (“The single-index CAPM fails 
empirical tests because the single-market index used to test these models fails to fully 
explain returns on too many securities.”); Cochrane & Culp, supra note 193, at 75 
(“Unfortunately, no single empirical representation [of capital asset pricing] ‘wins’, and the 
quest for a simple, reliable and commonly accepted implementation of the fundamental 
value equation continues.”); Nai-Fu Chen, Richard Roll & Stephen A. Ross, Economic 
Forces and the Stock Market, 59 J. BUS. 383, 384 (1986) (“The theory has been silent, 
however, about which events are likely to influence all assets. A rather embarrassing gap 
exists between the theoretically exclusive importance of systematic ‘state variables’ and our 
complete ignorance of their identity.”). 
 211. BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 206. 
 212. Id. at 191. Financiers often use “a broad market index such as the S&P 500” as a 
proxy for the market index. See id. at 120 n.4. 
 213. Id. at 206.  
 214. Id.  
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This modern strain of research has led to the development of multifactor 
asset pricing models, which “allow for several systematic factors . . . [to] 
provide better descriptions of security returns.”215 It is under these 
multifactor models that priced risk—in this context, synonymous with 
systematic risk216—becomes relevant.217 
Although debate continues as a general matter as to which risks should 
be factored into asset pricing models as priced risks, several articles from 
applied financial literature have identified political risk as one such type of 
priced risk.218 This author proposes that Jurisdictional Risk should be 
analyzed as a form of priced political risk.  
Unfortunately, academics have not reached agreement on the definition 
of “political risk.”219 In light of a lacking academic consensus, this paper 
adopts that definition of “political risk” used by The PRS Group (PRS), “[a] 
leading organization in the field” of quantitative political risk analytics. 220 
In determining a country’s political risk rating, PRS analyzes a country’s 
“government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, 
                                                                                                             
 215. Id. at 207 (emphasis added). 
 216. See, e.g., id. at 212, 212 n.15 (indicating that priced risk factors are those “that 
concern a large segment of investors” and suggesting that they include risks that cannot “be 
diversified away”); Cochrane & Culp, supra note 193, at 65 (“A central and classic idea in 
asset pricing is that only systematic risk generates a premium.”); cf. Chen, Roll & Ross, 
supra note 210, at 383 (“The general conclusion of theory is that an additional component of 
long-run return is required and obtained whenever a particular asset is influenced by 
systematic economic news and that no extra reward can be earned by (needlessly) bearing 
diversifiable risk.”). 
 217. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 212.  
 218. See Geert Bekaert & Campbell R. Harvey, Research in Emerging Markets Finance: 
Looking to the Future, 3 EMERGING MKTS. REV. 429, 443 (2002) (“[P]olitical risk is priced in 
many emerging markets.”) (citations omitted); Enrico C. Perotti & Pieter van Oijen, 
Privatization, Political Risk and Stock Market Development in Emerging Economies, 20 J. 
OF INT’L MONEY & FIN. 43, 47 (2001) (“[I]t seems that political risk is a priced factor for 
which investors are rewarded and that it strongly affects the local cost of equity, which may 
have implications for growth.”); cf. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, Law, 
Finance, and Firm Growth, 53 J. FIN. 2107, 2114 (1998) (“[F]irms may be able to 
compensate for the absence of specific legal protections by altering the provisions of 
contracts. It is much harder to compensate for systemic failures of the legal system.”). 
 219. See, e.g., Stephen J. Kobrin, Political Risk: A Review and Reconsideration, 10 J. 
INT’L BUS. STUD. 67, 67-68 (1979) (surveying the financial literature to identify at least six 
definitions of “political risk” and criticizing such literature for failing to “provide an analytic 
framework which can adequately contribute—in either a taxonomic or an operational 
sense—to improved practice”). 
 220. BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 621. See generally PRS GROUP, http://www. 
prsgroup.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
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internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious 
tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and 
bureaucratic quality.”221 
In particular, Jurisdictional Risk would seemingly be captured by PRS’s 
political risk components of bureaucracy quality,222 cross-border conflict, 223 
ethnic tensions,224 external conflict,225 investment profile,226 and law and 
order.227 Although it might be difficult to firmly place Jurisdictional Risk in 
any one of these subcategories of political risk, it seems clear that 
Jurisdictional Risk falls somewhere within PRS’s definition of “political 
risk.” Therefore, disagreements and ambiguities in the financial literature 
notwithstanding, one could rely on syllogism to conclude that because 
Jurisdictional Risk is a political risk,228 and because political risk is a priced 
risk,229 Jurisdictional Risk must therefore be a priced risk. 
If Jurisdictional Risk thus requires compensation of Investors in the form 
of a risk premium, this finding would have significant implications for 
                                                                                                             
 221. Guide to Data Variables, PRS GROUP, http://epub.prsgroup.com/list-of-all-variable-
definitions (last visited Mar. 4, 2016); see also ICRG Methodology, PRS GROUP, 
https://www.prsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/icrgmethodology.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2016) (detailing quantitative methodology for PRS’s International Country Risk 
Guide). 
 222. Guide to Data Variables, supra note 221 (defining “Bureaucracy Quality” as the 
“[i]nstitutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy” and indicating that bureaucratic 
“autonom[y] from political pressure” signifies diminished risk). 
 223. Id. (defining “Cross-border Conflict” as “[a]ctual or potential conflict with another 
nation state . . . which can range in severity from cross-border armed conflict and incursion 
to territorial claims subject to . . . litigation”). 
 224. Id. (defining “Ethnic Tensions” as “[a] measure of the degree of tension attributable 
to . . . national . . . divisions”). 
 225. Id. (indicating that “External Conflict” includes “Foreign Pressures,” which is 
defined as “[a]ctual or potential risk posed by pressures brought to bear on the government 
by one or more foreign states to force a change of policy”). 
 226. Id. (defining “Investment Profile” as “[a] measure of the factors affecting the risk to 
investment that are not covered by other . . . risk components”).  
 227. Id. (indicating that “[t]he ‘law’ subcomponent” of “Law & Order” considers “the 
strength and impartiality of the legal system”). 
 228. See generally id. 
 229. See Bekaert & Harvey, supra note 218, at 443 (“[P]olitical risk is priced in many 
emerging markets.”) (citations omitted); Perotti & Oijen, supra note 218, at 47 (“[I]t seems 
that political risk is a priced factor for which investors are rewarded and that it strongly 
affects the local cost of equity, which may have implications for growth.”); cf. Demirgüç-
Kunt & Maksimovic, supra note 218, at 2114 (“[F]irms may be able to compensate for the 
absence of specific legal protections by altering the provisions of contracts. It is much harder 
to compensate for systemic failures of the legal system.”). 
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public policy. Indeed, to analogize, antifraud liability under U.S. securities 
regulation appears to be at least partially premised on the notion that 
fraudulent financial disclosures pose a priced risk for investors. 230 
Securities regulation assumes that antifraud liability is necessary to prevent 
investors from “discounting the amount that they are willing to pay for 
securities to reflect the risk of fraud,” which would lead to an increased cost 
of capital for firms that issue securities were fraud unregulated such that it 
could become a systematic threat.231 
If Jurisdictional Risk similarly proves to be a priced risk, Investors who 
seek to sell capital to tribal parties also need regulatory protection—
namely, in the form of enhanced jurisdictional certainty to reduce litigation 
costs. Absent such protections—so long as Jurisdictional Risk is left 
unchecked—Investors “will demand meaningful risk premiums to bear 
exposure to th[at] source[] of risk.”232 
The requirement of a Jurisdictional Risk premium would impede growth 
of tribal economies by increasing the cost of capital.233 Indeed, investors’ 
first consideration in deciding whether to invest is the amount of risk 
premium “offered to compensate for the risk involved in investing.”234 
Owing to risk aversion, would-be investors will refuse to invest in a 
portfolio of risky assets (such as the theoretical basket of all tribal 
investment assets) absent a positive, nonzero risk premium and will 
otherwise “shy away” from risky portfolios that have a low ratio of “risk 
premium relative to risk.”235 In fact, when “risk premiums fall, . . . 
relatively more risk-averse investors will pull their funds out of the 
risky . . . portfolio, placing them instead in the risk-free asset”236—which, 
                                                                                                             
 230. See generally STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES 
AND ANALYSIS 198 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 4th ed., 2015). 
 231. See id. (“[F]raud may influence how investors direct their capital. . . . [D]iscounting 
means that publicly-traded firms will face a higher cost of capital if capital markets are 
infected by fraud.”). 
 232. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 212; see also id. at 195 (“[W]e would expect 
the reward, or the risk premium on individual assets, to depend on the risk an individual 
asset contributes to the overall portfolio.”); Cochrane & Culp, supra note 193, at 65 
(indicating that “asset prices are equal to the expected cashflow discounted at the risk-free 
rate, plus a risk premium”). 
 233. Cf. BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 195 (indicating that CAPM’s required rate of 
return is the rate “that will compensate investors for the risk of that investment, as well as for 
the time value of money”). 
 234. See id. at 119.  
 235. See id. at 120.  
 236. Id. at 192-93. 
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in this instance, would constitute anything but tribal investments subject to 
Jurisdictional Risk. 
 This theory, of course, needs empirical testing, especially considering the 
developing nature of research into both political risk and priced risk. 
However, research into tribal economics seems consistent with the notion 
that Jurisdictional Risk is a priced risk. A 2003 article from the South 
Dakota Business Review, for example, indicates “a long history of both 
private and tribal enterprises that have failed on [South Dakota’s] 
reservations,” attributing such failure to the absence of a “rule of law.”237 
The South Dakota Bankers Association (the “Association”) cited that 
study in a 2014 amicus curiae brief supporting a pending petition for 
certiorari, extrapolating the findings to conclude that non-tribal businesses 
“limit the amount of business they do on-reservations . . . because the risk 
associated with not knowing the rules before the game begins simply 
outweighs the potential economic benefit.”238 The Association, though 
focused specifically on the expansion of tribal jurisdiction, articulated 
concerns regarding added “uncertainty and [non-tribal] reluctance [to 
invest], the net result of which will be continued economic hardship for 
those living on and near Indian reservations.”239 
The Association’s findings are consistent not only with the concepts of 
home bias and capital asset pricing, but also with general principles of 
international business strategy. In fact, “[i]nstability in a national 
government creates numerous problems, including economic risks and 
uncertainty created by government regulations; the existence of many, 
possibly conflicting, legal authorities; and the potential nationalization of 
private assets.”240 Stabilization of tribal governments—or at least the 
clarification of their judicial authority—however, is likely to draw 
additional non-tribal investment.241 
                                                                                                             
 237. Brown & Selk, supra note 101, at 14 (emphasis omitted) (identifying un-honored 
contracts and nepotism as examples of breaches of typical Anglo-American law that prevent 
the “attracting [of] outside capital and the process of development and growth that is so 
desperately needed on the American Indian reservations in South Dakota”). 
 238. Brief for South Dakota Bankers Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
supra note 103. See generally Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 
554 U.S. 316 (2008). 
 239. Brief for South Dakota Bankers Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
supra note 103, at 2. 
 240. See, e.g., HOSKISSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 288. 
 241. See id. (“Changes in government policies can dramatically influence the 
attractiveness of direct foreign investment.”); see also Brown & Selk, supra note 101, at 13 
(“One of the first requisites of a successful economy is good governance. This . . . provides 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol40/iss1/5
No. 1] COMMENTS 165 
 
 
Thus, considering the great deal of uncertainty and risk surrounding the 
case-by-case application of the canon of tribal civil jurisdiction, it seems 
likely that potential Indian Country Investors are shifting the costs of 
heightened Jurisdictional Risk to tribal parties via risk premiums242 or are 
routing their funds elsewhere243—to the detriment of tribal economies. 
IV. Solutions 
Solutions to the pervasive uncertainty of tribal civil jurisdiction currently 
exist, though each existing solution faces significant flaws. Suits 
challenging jurisdiction in state and federal court are perhaps the most 
obvious, though suit is not a helpful option for preventing jurisdictional 
controversy, and the unpredictability of judicial opinions has created most 
of the uncertainty in the first place. But, where lawsuits become necessary, 
litigants and courts should look to the Ninth Circuit’s Water Wheel 
Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance for clarity and guidance.244 
Sophisticated parties also have the proactive option to contractually 
mitigate Jurisdictional Risk with forum selection and arbitration clauses. 
These clauses may not always be practically available to less-sophisticated 
parties, however, and are not always fully reliable in the field of tribal 
law.245 
Therefore, because existing legal mechanisms fail to fully remedy the 
inherent uncertainties of tribal civil jurisdiction, a delegation of rulemaking 
authority to the Bureau of Indian Affairs—with a policy of maximizing 
clarity and predictability in the law—is likely desirable. 
  
                                                                                                             
the stability which encourages the inflow of investment capital in response to profit 
opportunities which is necessary for economic growth.”). 
 242. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 101, at 193 (explaining that investors require an 
increased risk premium in response to increased systematic risk). 
 243. See id. at 120 (explaining that risk aversion causes investors to “shy away” from 
risky portfolios that offer inadequate risk premiums). 
 244. 642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 245. See generally Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of 
Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 932, 946 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding a contract between an ousted 
tribal leader putatively on behalf of the tribe and a service provider invalid on grounds of 
capacity, thus barring suit on grounds of tribal sovereign immunity and thus barring 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement). 
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A. A Suggested Framework for Federal or State Suits to Challenge Tribal 
Jurisdiction 
A federal or state suit to challenge tribal jurisdiction remains the most 
obvious solution to the uncertainties surrounding tribal civil jurisdiction, 
but it fails to truly resolve the problem of diminished non-tribal investment 
in tribal economies. Given that suit is among the least proactive and most 
delay-filled solutions available, this option will fail to encourage Investors 
currently avoiding tribal investments due to Jurisdictional Risk246 because 
the party must make the initial investment and be sued in tribal court before 
suit to challenge tribal jurisdiction becomes an option.247  
Lawsuits thus largely fail to address the chilling effects imposed upon 
Investors that lead to excessively conservative, risk-averse behavior with 
respect to investing in Indian Country. This is because suits that are not 
granted certiorari for United States Supreme Court review will have 
minimal prospective effect, will create additional circuit splits and 
additional confusion, and will perhaps defeat expectation interests in having 
retroactive effects upon parties to the suit. Additional shortcomings of 
relying on federal lawsuits to challenge the current canon of tribal 
jurisdiction include an inconsistent and underdeveloped doctrine, 
substantial costs and delay to the parties who go through appeals in two 
judicial systems, and the encouragement of judicially disfavored dilatory 
tactics and excessive lawyering to increase attorney fees at cost to the 
parties and the federal-state-tribal judicial system (the “Tripartite 
Judiciary”).248 
Although suit does not pose a strong solution to these policy concerns, it 
remains one of the few avenues available to Investors preferring to litigate 
substantive claims in state or federal court under the current canon of tribal 
civil jurisdiction. Lawsuits also provide additional benefits with respect to 
resolving jurisdictional disputes in that they support tribal sovereignty and 
the development of a tribe’s own rules of civil jurisdiction, and up-front 
costs to the Tripartite Judiciary remain minimal, given no need for 
                                                                                                             
 246. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 322. 
 247. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992) (“[A] plaintiff 
raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his 
and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking 
relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does 
not state an Article III case or controversy [to achieve standing].”) 
 248. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94-95 (2009) (requiring that jurisdictional 
rules be based on policies valuing “predictability,” cost savings and expedience, 
“administrative simplicity,” and an avoidance of “greater litigation” and “strange results”). 
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structural change or a substantial learning curve—although long-term costs 
with respect to docket administration and judicial resources remain 
substantial. 
Despite these caveats, federal suit to challenge tribal jurisdiction has 
been the driving force behind the development of tribal procedural law, and 
this trend is likely to continue pending legislative action. In fact, the federal 
judiciary’s struggle to articulate a modern workable analytical framework 
for questions of tribal jurisdiction took at least fifty-two years—the length 
of time between the foundational Williams case and the recently decided 
Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance.249 Unfortunately, 
the Water Wheel parties did not file a petition for certiorari,250 so the 
clearest and most reasoned analysis on questions of tribal civil jurisdiction 
remains binding only in the Ninth Circuit. Thus, other circuits and the 
United States Supreme Court should endorse the case’s reasoning in future 
appeals.  
The strength of Water Wheel lies in its clear articulation of the general 
requirements for tribal civil jurisdiction and its creation of a clear 
dichotomy between subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction in 
tribal courts. In contrast, many other foundational cases speak in 
jurisdictional generalities, failing to make this crucial distinction that 
implicates predictability and consistency in future adjudications.251 Tribal 
civil jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit explains, inheres in cases where a tribal 
court may exercise concurrent subject matter and personal jurisdiction.252  
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Tribal subject matter jurisdiction, under Water Wheel, requires the 
presence of both regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction.253 Regulatory 
jurisdiction may be found in three circumstances, the first involving 
occurrences on tribal-owned land and the second and third involving 
                                                                                                             
 249. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). See generally Water Wheel, 642 F.3d 
802. 
 250. See generally Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 802. 
 251. Id. at 809. See generally Williams, 358 U.S. 217 (abstaining from mentioning either 
personal or subject matter jurisdiction). 
 252. Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 809 (providing no citation to supporting authority). 
 253. Id.; see also Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of 
the Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 937-41 (8th Cir. 2010) (articulating the Eighth Circuit’s 
framework for subject matter jurisdiction analysis); MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 
F.3d 1057, 1068-76 (10th Cir. 2007) (articulating the Tenth Circuit’s framework for subject 
matter jurisdiction analysis). 
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occurrences on non-tribal land.254 Where the non-Indian’s transaction or 
occurrence occurred on tribal-owned land, regulatory jurisdiction occurs as 
a result of the tribe’s retained, inherent sovereignty so long as the incident 
“interfered directly with” a tribe’s exclusionary authority and “competing 
state interests” are not implicated.255  
Alternatively, regulatory jurisdiction may result from a non-Indian’s 
transaction or occurrence on non-tribal land under Montana’s Commercial 
Relationship Exception or Self-Governance Exception.256  
After finding regulatory jurisdiction, Water Wheel advises, courts must 
inquire into the existence of adjudicatory jurisdiction.257 Adjudicatory 
jurisdiction is usually limited by the bounds of the tribe’s regulatory 
jurisdiction.258 Thus, although adjudicatory jurisdiction certainly cannot 
exist in the absence of regulatory jurisdiction, the perhaps narrower bounds 
of adjudicatory jurisdiction remain largely undetermined.259 
According to earlier Supreme Court precedent, questions of subject 
matter jurisdiction also require “a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, 
the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or 
diminished, as well as a detailed study of the relevant statutes, Executive 
Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or 
judicial decisions.”260  
                                                                                                             
 254. Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 814, 817. 
 255. Id. at 814. But see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001) (holding that 
Montana’s general rule that tribal courts lack civil jurisdiction over non-tribal parties applies 
regardless of whether land is tribe-owned). 
 256. See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 817 (“The tribe clearly had authority to regulate . . . 
under Montana’s first exception and . . . under the second exception as well.”); see also 
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66. 
 257. See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 814. 
 258. Id.; Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (“As to nonmembers . . . a 
tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction[,] [a]bsent 
congressional direction enlarging tribal-court jurisdiction.”). 
 259. See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 814 (“The Supreme Court has not yet considered the 
question of adjudicative authority where regulatory jurisdiction exists.”); see also Nevada v. 
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358, 374 (2001) (stating that “the question whether a tribe’s 
adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmember defendants equals its legislative jurisdiction” 
remained unanswered as well). 
 260. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow, 471 U.S. 845, 855-56 (1985); see also 
Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa, 609 
F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2010) (providing a slightly different articulation of the balancing test, 
specifically considering the interests of non-Indians, but not specifying to which of the 
several components of tribal civil jurisdiction this test applies). 
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2. Personal Jurisdiction 
Perhaps the greatest contribution of Water Wheel is that it is one of the 
first and only cases on tribal civil jurisdiction to apply personal jurisdiction 
analysis261 according to the well-developed federal canon.262 
a) Tag Jurisdiction and Physical Presence 
Citing Burnham v. Superior Court as authority for “tag”263 and physical 
presence personal jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit suggests that tribal 
personal jurisdiction “exists over defendants physically present in the forum 
state”—that is, on Indian-owned land.264 The Water Wheel Court found that 
tribal personal jurisdiction existed over the plaintiff challenging the tribal 
court’s jurisdiction as a result of “[i]n-state personal service” and because 
that plaintiff’s domicile lay on Indian-owned land—which “on its own 
serves as a basis for personal jurisdiction.”265  
b) Minimum Contacts Analysis 
In addition to Burnham’s tag and physical presence jurisdiction, the 
court in Water Wheel went on to recognize a third basis of support for the 
tribal court’s personal jurisdiction: minimum contacts analysis.266 Under 
International Shoe, a court may maintain personal jurisdiction over a party 
outside the forum state where the court’s jurisdiction would “not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”267 Although far 
beyond the scope of this comment, this basic rule of International Shoe 
began a long line of personal jurisdiction precedent known as “minimum 
contacts” analysis, under which “a defendant may be subjected to a 
                                                                                                             
 261. See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 819 (“To exercise civil authority over a defendant, a 
tribal court must have both personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.”). 
 262. See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 263. Linda J. Silberman, Reflections on Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward 
Presumptive Rules of Jurisdiction and Implications for Choice of Law, 22 RUTGERS L. J. 
569, 569 n.3 (1991) (“‘Tag’ jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction asserted over a defendant who 
is physically served with process while physically present within the state . . . [T]he term 
usually implies that the defendant is not a permanent resident or a domiciliary of the forum 
state but is only temporarily physically present.”). 
 264. See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 819 (citing Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 
610 (1990)). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 819-20 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). 
 267. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940), 
overruling recognized by Carson v. Brodin, 585 S.E.2d 491 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003)). 
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judgment in personam, even if not present within the territory of the forum, 
if the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the jurisdiction.”268 
Additional research regarding the integration of International Shoe into 
the doctrine of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians is merited. Until 
subsequent research and case law clarifies the analysis for challenges to 
tribal civil jurisdiction, however, proactive parties may be better served by 
careful contract drafting. 
B. Contract Drafting as a Risk-Reduction Strategy 
Many Investors and the tribal entities they transact with may easily and 
with minimum additional transactional costs draft forum selection and 
arbitration clauses into transactional documents to decrease jurisdictional 
uncertainty. 
While proactive drafting will help in many situations, in many others it 
will not. This solution assumes that all parties are sophisticated and have 
access to legal counsel and that all tribal-non-tribal agreements are 
governed by contract. These assumptions are often violated, as 
unsophisticated tribal-non-tribal transactions do occur, and Montana 
demonstrates that tribal jurisdiction can be granted or denied on bases not 
involving contracts.269 Even where all of these assumptions hold true, tribal 
law may not provide for reliable contract enforcement.270 
Thus, although careful drafting cannot provide a long-term or holistic 
solution to the lacking clarity in the law of tribal civil jurisdiction, it can 
provide some risk mitigation in the present. 
1. Forum Selection Clauses 
The enforcement271 and validity272 of forum selection clauses are often 
governed by federal law, and such clauses are “prima facie valid” despite 
                                                                                                             
 268. 28 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 65:10 (Westlaw) (updated Dec. 2015). 
 269. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (providing for regulatory 
jurisdiction under a first exception for “consensual relationships . . . through commercial 
dealing . . . or other arrangements” and under a second exception for “conduct threaten[ing] 
or . . . direct[ly] [a]ffect[ing] . . . the political integrity, the economic security, or the health 
or welfare of the tribe”). 
 270. See, e.g., Brown & Selk, supra note 101, at 14 (“Unfortunately, the rule of law . . . 
does not exist on a number of [South Dakota] reservations. Contracts . . . have not been 
honored. . . . [C]hanges in tribal leadership have led to arbitrary violation of contracts which 
has amounted to expropriation of private property.”). 
 271. See, e.g., Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. District Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 
(2013) (indicating that the federal change of venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), is “the 
appropriate provision to enforce the forum-selection clause in this case”); Stewart Org., Inc. 
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an earlier tradition of judicial disfavor.273 The contemporary Supreme Court 
has articulated a policy of upholding forum selection clauses “in the light of 
present-day commercial realities and expanding international trade.”274 
Therefore, a party seeking to strike forum selection clauses as unreasonable 
must satisfy a “heavy burden of proof” in showing that the forum selection 
clause poses obstacles “so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he 
will . . . be deprived of his day in court.”275 Factors demonstrating 
unreasonableness include clauses seeking to transfer “local disputes [to] a 
remote alien forum . . . to apply differing foreign law,” violation of “a 
strong public policy” domestic to the suit’s originating form, contracts of 
adhesion, and unforeseeable controversies or inconvenience.276  
The Supreme Court has indicated that it will also review forum selection 
clauses for fundamental fairness.277 In doing so, the Court will consider 
whether the drafter was motivated by convenience or caprice, whether the 
                                                                                                             
v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 25, 30 (1988) (affirming an Eleventh Circuit ruling that 
“questions of venue in diversity actions are governed by federal law,” even where contrary 
state law exists); id. at 31 (“[A] forum-selection clause . . . should receive neither dispositive 
consideration (as respondent might have it) nor no consideration (as Alabama law might 
have it), but rather the consideration for which Congress provided in § 1404(a). . . . This is 
thus not a case in which state and federal rules ‘can exist side by side . . . each controlling its 
own intended sphere of coverage without conflict.’”) (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 
446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980)).  
 272. See Matthew J. Sorenson, Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal 
Court After Atlantic Marine, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521, 2546 (2014) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court [in Atlantic Marine] . . . left open the question of whether state or federal law governs 
the validity of forum-selection clauses in diversity cases,” though “[m]any courts, even in 
diversity cases, uncritically assume that since the enforcement of forum-selection clauses is 
sometimes governed by federal law, the validity must also be a question of federal law.”). 
 273. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991), superseded in 
part by statute, 46 U.S.C. § 183c (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30509) (quoting The 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), superseded in part by statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1404(a)). But see Sorenson, supra note 272, at 2533 (indicating that Atlantic 
Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568, “set[] aside the holding in The Bremen that forum clauses are prima 
facie valid . . . [without] explicitly overruling it”). 
 274. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15, 17 (adjudicating “a freely negotiated international 
commercial transaction between a German and an American corporation for towage of a 
vessel”), superseded in part by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
 275. Id. at 17-18, superseded in part by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
 276. Id. at 15-18, superseded in part by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
 277. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 587, 590, 595 (hearing an admiralty case and 
specifically referencing “passage contracts” between American parties hailing from different 
states), superseded in part by statute, 46 U.S.C. § 183c (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 
30509). 
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drafter committed fraud or overreaching, whether the non-drafting party 
received notice, and whether the non-drafting party would be prejudiced in 
refusing the contract.278 
Although the case did not involve tribal courts, Carnival Cruise Lines, 
Inc. v. Shute demonstrates the liberality with which federal courts uphold 
traditional forum selection clauses.279 In Carnival, plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. 
Shute, of Washington, bought cruise tickets from Florida-headquartered 
Carnival.280 Carnival printed on the tickets a forum selection clause 
requiring all suits be litigated in Florida.281 
After beginning the cruise in California and sailing into international 
waters near Mexico, Mrs. Shute slipped and fell while touring the ship.282 
The couple subsequently sued in a Washington federal court, and Carnival 
filed a motion for summary judgment relying on the plaintiffs’ failure to 
observe the forum selection clause.283 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the forum selection clause.284 The 
Court implied that the routineness of a transaction and the actual bargaining 
power of a plaintiff in a form contract is not a strong consideration under 
fundamental fairness review so long as plaintiffs “were given notice of the 
forum provision and . . . retained the option of rejecting the contract with 
impunity.”285 
Rather, the Court subjugated plaintiffs’ lack of bargaining power to 
several policy interests.286 First, the Court cited Carnival’s “special interest” 
in substantially reducing the locations in which it may be sued owing to its 
wide geographic presence.287 Second, the Court valued “dispelling any 
confusion” regarding the appropriate forum and “sparing litigants the time 
and expense of . . . determin[ing] the correct forum and conserving judicial 
resources.”288 Third, the Court valued the cost savings that have and will 
                                                                                                             
 278. See id. at 595. 
 279. See generally id. 
 280. Id. at 587. 
 281. Id. at 587-88. 
 282. Id. at 588. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 595, 597. 
 285. Id. at 595. 
 286. See id. at 593-94. 
 287. Id. at 593. 
 288. Id. at 593-94. 
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continue to accrue to passengers as a result of decreased jurisdictional risk 
to Carnival.289 
Despite the Supreme Court’s general support for traditional forum 
selection clauses, there is much less agreement as to how courts should 
handle forum selection clauses attempting to avoid tribal civil jurisdiction. 
One scholar identifies at least four different approaches among federal and 
state courts addressing the effects of such forum selection clauses, with 
some jurisdictions deferring the matter to the discretion of tribal courts 
under the tribal exhaustion doctrine.290  
Unfortunately, adherence to the tribal exhaustion doctrine contradicts the 
very purpose of a forum selection clause: reducing cost and uncertainty 
related to the appropriate jurisdiction for litigation.291 The delay and 
expense of the tribal exhaustion doctrine is particularly pronounced because 
litigants seeking to challenge tribal civil jurisdiction must submit to 
proceedings in lower and appellate tribal courts before challenging tribal 
jurisdiction in federal courts.292 
In observance of the fact that forum-selection clauses are much less 
effective in reducing Jurisdictional Risk when tribal courts are involved, 
                                                                                                             
 289. Id. at 594; see also The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) 
(“[M]uch uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both parties could arise if a suit 
could be maintained in any jurisdiction . . . where the [parties] might happen to be found. 
The elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to 
both parties is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and contracting”), 
superseded in part by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
 290. See generally Buckman, supra note 7, § 14[a] (indicating that some courts have 
“held that forum selection provisions in contracts between non-Indians and Indians or Indian 
tribes eliminate the requirement of tribal exhaustion”); id. § 14[b] (indicating that some 
courts have “held that forum selection provisions in contracts between non-Indians and 
Indians or Indian tribes do not serve to remove the requirement of tribal exhaustion”); id. § 
14[c] (indicating that some courts have “held that Indian parties may not waive the tribal 
exhaustion requirement in contractual agreements with non-Indians”); id. § 14.5 (indicating 
that some courts “recogniz[e] that tribal exhaustion requirements do not necessarily apply to 
deprive federal courts of jurisdiction that is obtained concurrently with tribal jurisdiction 
over matters involving contracts between tribe members and non-Indians”). See also supra 
Section II.B. 
 291. Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 
25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 51, 51-52 (1992) (“Forum-selection clauses . . . permit parties to 
select a desirable, perhaps neutral, forum in which to litigate disputes. Such planning . . . 
obviat[es] a potentially costly struggle at the outset of litigation over jurisdiction and 
venue.”). 
 292. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17 (1987); see also supra Section II.B. 
For exhaustive coverage of the tribal exhaustion doctrine, see generally Buckman, supra 
note 7. 
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parties may not be able to rely as heavily on this device in the tribal context. 
Therefore, parties may desire additional or alternative methods of 
mitigating Jurisdictional Risk. 
2. Arbitration Clauses 
Addressing policy and business concerns similar to those addressed by 
forum selection clauses, arbitration clauses represent another mechanism by 
which parties might seek to create certainty. The Supreme Court has 
recognized that the United States “cannot have trade and commerce in 
world markets . . . exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and 
resolved in our courts.”293 As such, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
provides liberal support for traditional arbitration clauses.294 In fact, except 
“upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract,” an arbitration clause “shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable.”295  
A party seeking to enforce an arbitration clause may seek an injunction 
compelling arbitration pursuant to the clause from a federal court that 
would have federal question or diversity jurisdiction over the agreement but 
for the arbitration clause.296 The Act requires that federal courts issue such 
an injunction where agreement formation and performance are not at 
issue.297 
Where issues of formation or performance must be resolved, however, 
the Supreme Court has held that a reviewing court must first search for an 
                                                                                                             
 293. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (quoting The Bremen, 407 
U.S. at 9). 
 294. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (“[The FAA’s] 
purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had 
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place 
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”); see also Volt Info. Sci. v. 
Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (“[T]he federal policy 
is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to 
arbitrate.”). See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012). 
 295. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 296. See id. § 4 (“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another 
to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district 
court which, save for such agreement, would have [subject matter] jurisdiction under Title 
28 . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such 
agreement.”). 
 297. See id. (“[U]pon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or 
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the 
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”). 
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agreement to arbitrate under the Federal Arbitration Act.298 The scope of an 
arbitration agreement is delineated by the language of an agreement, but in 
the presence of ambiguity, the arbitration clause will be construed so as to 
favor arbitration.299 Where the FAA applies, courts presume an arbitration 
clause is valid even when parties allege the agreement as a whole is 
unenforceable because the Supreme Court has ruled that arbitration clauses 
are severable components from an otherwise unenforceable contract.300 
Upon finding a valid arbitration clause, a reviewing court must then 
“consider[] whether legal constraints external to the parties’ agreement 
foreclosed the arbitration.”301 In assessing enforceability of arbitration 
clauses, courts consider “concerns of international comity, respect for the 
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need 
of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of 
disputes,” with these factors sometimes trumping “a contrary result . . . in a 
domestic context.”302 It would appear that courts must also consider rules 
affecting the broader category of forum selection clauses, as the Supreme 
Court has held that arbitration agreements are, “in effect, a specialized kind 
of forum-selection clause.”303 
Furthermore, where a party seeks judicial confirmation of an arbitral 
award, a federal court has discretion to vacate the award upon finding fraud 
in achieving the award, arbitrator “partiality or corruption,” arbitrator 
misconduct, ultra vires arbitrator action, or the lack of a “mutual, final, and 
definite award.”304 
 Despite these general rules, strong federal support for arbitration clauses 
loses significant force when tribal courts are involved, as some federal 
courts analyze arbitration clauses similarly to forum selection clauses, 
                                                                                                             
 298. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 
(1985); see also Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 297 (2010). 
 299. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289, 294 (2002); see also Moses 
H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (“[A]ny doubts 
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether 
the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of 
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”). 
 300. See Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 298-99 (noting that this presumption does not apply 
where the arbitration clause or contract formation—as opposed to contract enforceability—
are at issue). 
 301. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628. 
 302. Id. at 629. 
 303. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974). 
 304. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012); see also id. § 11 (articulating scenarios in which a 
federal court may modify an arbitral award). 
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demanding adherence to the tribal exhaustion doctrine.305 Thus, again, 
litigants seeking to challenge tribal civil jurisdiction must submit to 
proceedings in lower and appellate tribal courts before challenging tribal 
jurisdiction in federal courts.306 Therefore, the threat of the exhaustion 
doctrine significantly reduces the effectiveness of forum selection and 
arbitration clauses in tribal-non-tribal commerce. 
3. Drafting Remains an Imperfect Solution to the Labyrinthine System of 
Tribal Civil Jurisdiction 
The exhaustion doctrine is not the only shortcoming of traditional 
drafting strategies when applied in tribal contexts. For example, Water 
Wheel and Montana demonstrate that regulatory jurisdiction may be 
established on several grounds independent of contractual relationships, 
thus creating multiple situations in which the availability of drafting cannot 
remedy the risks surrounding tribal civil jurisdiction—especially for 
unsophisticated parties or those lacking access to counsel.  
Water Wheel held that a tribe’s retained, inherent sovereignty alone is 
sufficient grounds for regulatory jurisdiction over a non-Indian’s (perhaps 
noncontractual) conduct on tribal-owned land when the conduct “interfered 
directly with” a tribe’s exclusionary authority and “competing state 
interests” are not implicated.307  
Alternatively, regulatory jurisdiction may result from a non-Indian’s 
transaction or occurrence on non-tribal land under either Montana 
exception.308 Even Montana’s Commercial Relationship Exception might 
not require a contract, specifying that tribal regulation of non-Indians may 
result where the regulated party voluntarily completed “commercial 
dealing . . . or other arrangements” with a tribal entity.309 Montana’s Self-
Governance Exception also allows for regulatory jurisdiction outside of 
contract-based relationships as a result of “retain[ed] inherent power” 
where the non-Indian’s transaction or occurrence “threatens or has some 
                                                                                                             
 305. See generally Buckman, supra note 7, § 15.  
 306. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17 (1987); see also supra Section II.B. 
For exhaustive coverage of the tribal exhaustion doctrine, see generally Buckman, supra 
note 7. 
 307. Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 814 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 308. See id. at 817 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (“The 
tribe clearly had authority to regulate . . . under Montana’s first exception and . . . under the 
second exception as well.”). 
 309. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). 
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direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health 
or welfare of the tribe.”310 
Furthermore, even where regulatory jurisdiction stems from a contractual 
relationship, enforcement of contracts between a tribal and a non-tribal 
party appears to be a developing and sometimes troublesome area of law. 311 
Contracts with tribes, for example, are governed by federal statute and 
Department of Interior regulation.312 Where such a contract was not validly 
formed, any forum selection or arbitration clauses become moot.313 
Attorney’s Process and Investigation Services, Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of 
the Mississippi in Iowa demonstrates the hazards of relying on 
Jurisdictional Risk-reduction clauses and enforcing contracts between tribal 
and non-tribal parties in general, as this case’s non-tribal party was not even 
entitled to rely on a federal Bureau of Indian Affairs proclamation of which 
party was governing a tribe so as to have contracting authority. 
In Attorney’s Process, the Eighth Circuit held invalid a contract, and its 
contained arbitration clause, between a non-tribal casino security 
corporation and the Sac and Fox Tribe owing to insufficient contracting 
authority in connection with a tribal coup d’etat.314 A dissident contingency 
vying for control of the tribe ousted the incumbent tribal council chairman 
from tribal facilities both physically and by special election, though an 
administrative delay left the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 
continuing to recognize the incumbent’s authority.315 When federal courts 
                                                                                                             
 310. Id. at 566. 
 311. See, e.g., Brown & Selk, supra note 101, at 14 (“Unfortunately, the rule of law . . . 
does not exist on a number of [South Dakota] reservations. Contracts . . . have not been 
honored. . . . [C]hanges in tribal leadership have led to arbitrary violation of contracts which 
has amounted to expropriation of private property.”). 
 312. 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2012). 
 313. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 302 (2010) (“[A] 
court may submit to arbitration ‘only those disputes . . . that the parties have agreed to 
submit.’”); see also id. at 299 (“[C]ourts should order arbitration of a dispute only where the 
court is satisfied that neither the formation of the parties’ arbitration agreement nor . . . its 
enforceability or applicability to the dispute is in issue.”) But see id. at 298-99 (“[A]t least in 
cases governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, courts must treat the arbitration clause as 
severable from the contract in which it appears, and thus apply the clause to all disputes 
within its scope ‘[u]nless the [validity] challenge is to the arbitration clause itself’ or the 
party ‘disputes the formation of [the] contract.’”) (citations omitted). 
 314. Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of the Miss. in 
Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 930-32, 945-46 (8th Cir. 2010); see also Wandrie-Harjo v. Chief-
Boswell, No. CIV–11–171–F, 2011 WL 7807743 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 15, 2011) (documenting 
a governance dispute of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma). 
 315. Attorney’s Process, 609 F.3d at 930-32. 
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refused to decide the governance dispute, the incumbent chairman 
contracted with the security company “[p]utatively acting as council 
chairman” despite having lost the special election.316 The contract, 
including an arbitration clause, called for the security company to search for 
evidence of illegal activity related to the coup and to perform security 
services related to the tribe’s temporarily closed casino.317 
Approximately four months into the contract, with the BIA continuing to 
recognize the incumbent as the rightful tribal leader, weapon-carrying 
security company personnel stormed dissident-occupied tribal buildings to 
retrieve “confidential information . . . related to the Tribe’s gaming 
operations and finances.”318 In connection with this event, the newly elected 
dissidents sued the security company in tribal court for various tort claims, 
including a conversion claim related to payment of the company’s service 
fees from the tribal treasury.319 Considering the tribal courts validated the 
dissident chairman’s governing authority owing to his successful special 
election, the tribal courts found the incumbent chairman was unable to bind 
the tribe in the security services contract.320 
In response, the security company sued in federal court seeking to 
enforce the arbitration clause it secured with the incumbent chairman. 321 
After a fairly nuanced procedural history leading to an indeterminate Eighth 
Circuit review also of the tribal court’s subject matter jurisdiction,322 the 
Eighth Circuit proceeded to review the validity of the arbitration clause. 323 
The Eighth Circuit ruled that tribal law, not federal law, applies to tribal 
leadership disputes.324 As such, the federal BIA’s validation of tribal 
leadership cannot bind tribes, and leadership disputes must be resolved by 
the tribes alone.325 It thus follows that only tribal courts can decide whether 
an ousted incumbent leader had power to bind the tribe by contract.326 Thus, 
                                                                                                             
 316. Id. at 932. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 933. 
 321. Id. at 932-33. 
 322. Id. at 941 (“[A] remand is necessary so that the district court may consider the 
applicability of the first Montana exception . . . .”). 
 323. Id. at 942-43. 
 324. Id. at 943.  
 325. See id. 
 326. Id. 
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the Eighth Circuit held the contract as a whole, including its arbitration 
clause and waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, to be invalid.327  
The court was not persuaded by the security company’s policy 
arguments that depriving non-tribal businesses of the ability to trust 
“federal agency recognition of a particular tribal government could interfere 
with the provision of services to Indian tribes.”328 Although the company 
was likely correct, the court found the arguments legally “irrelevant” due to 
the nonexistence of “congressional intent to authorize the encroachment 
upon tribal sovereignty.”329 
C. The Need for Additional Administrative Research Under the Existing 
Regulatory Scheme 
In recognition of the fact that Investors’ only self-help options—federal 
lawsuits and drafting to reduce risk—suffer from significant flaws that are 
detrimental to tribes, Investors, and the Tripartite Judiciary, Congress 
should step in to provide additional rules and policies to guide the largely 
blind judiciary’s hand. This is especially true given that the federal 
government bears “responsibility . . . for the protection and preservation of 
Indian tribes . . . through the endorsement of treaties, and the enactment of 
other laws, including laws that provide for the exercise of administrative 
authorities.”330 
Luckily, the federal government’s unique relationship with the tribes 
leaves this most flexible of options available.331 In fact, the Indian 
Commerce Clause, federal-tribal treaties, and “inherent” federal authority 
provide Congress with “plenary and exclusive” authority over the tribes. 332 
This allows Congress to “enact legislation that both restricts, and in turn, 
relaxes . . . restrictions on tribal sovereign authority.”333 
Fortunately, the existing statutory and regulatory scheme is already at 
least partially equipped to tackle this obstacle. Although Congress has not 
expressly delegated regulation of tribal civil jurisdiction to an 
administrative body, it has seemingly provided the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2, extremely broad regulatory jurisdiction 
                                                                                                             
 327. Id. at 945. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(5) (2012). 
 331. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981). 
 332. MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057, 1068 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200-01 (2004)). 
 333. Id. (quoting Lara, 541 U.S. at 202). 
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over “the management of all Indian affairs and of all matters arising out of 
Indian relations.”334  
More explicit and modern statutes have since created niche 
administrative bodies specializing in tribal justice and commerce. Congress 
created the Office of Tribal Justice Support (OTJS) as a unit of the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, “to further the development, operation, and enhancement 
of tribal justice systems and Courts of Indian Offenses.”335 The office, 
although bearing regulatory authority over Courts of Indian Offenses 336—
administrative entities not to be confused with tribal courts337—has no 
regulatory authority over tribal courts.338 With respect to tribal courts, the 
Office of Tribal Justice Support is merely empowered to “conduct 
research,” “[p]romote cooperation” among judicial systems, and “provide 
technical assistance and training.”339 
In looking to tribal commerce, on the other hand, Congress created the 
Office of Native American Business Development (ONABD), a unit of the 
Department of Commerce,340 to promote:  
! Business development and cross-border transactions;  
! “private investment in the economies of Indian tribes”;  
! “long-range sustained growth” of tribal economies;  
! tribal poverty reduction;  
! “a higher standard of living on Indian reservations”; and  
! tribal “political self-determination.”341  
                                                                                                             
 334. 25 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see also id. § 9 (“The President may prescribe such 
regulations as he may think fit for carrying into effect the various provisions of any act 
relating to Indian affairs.”). 
 335. 25 U.S.C. § 3611(a) (2012). 
 336. See id. § 3611(c)(5). 
 337. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.102 (West, Westlaw through July 9, 2015) (“It is the purpose 
of . . . this part to provide adequate machinery for the administration of justice for Indian 
tribes in those areas . . . where tribes retain jurisdiction over Indians that is exclusive of State 
jurisdiction but where tribal courts have not been established . . . .”). 
 338. See 25 U.S.C. § 3611(d) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed or construed to 
authorize the Office to impose justice standards on Indian tribes.”); id. § 3631(1), (3) 
(“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to . . . encroach upon . . . the inherent sovereign 
authority of each tribal government to determine the role of the tribal justice system; . . . [or] 
impair the rights of each tribal government to determine the nature of its own legal 
system.”). 
 339. Id. § 3611(c)(2)-(4), (e)(1). 
 340. 25 U.S.C. § 4303(a)(1) (2012). 
 341. Id. § 4301(b)(1)-(6). 
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Although Congress granted the office no express authority to issue 
regulations, it tasked the office with “provid[ing] . . . financial and technical 
assistance . . . [to spur] economic development on Indian lands,” 
“coordinat[ing] Federal programs relating to Indian economic 
development . . . [with] any such program of the Department of the 
Interior,” and “any [other] activity . . . that is related to the development of 
appropriate markets.”342 Congress requires the office to prioritize projects 
“foster[ing] long-term stable economies of Indian tribes.”343 
Because the ONABD’s enabling act requires it to “coordinate Federal 
programs relating to Indian economic development . . . [with] any such 
program of the Department of the Interior,”344 it should immediately begin 
a research cooperative with the Bureau of Indian Affair’s OTJS, as this is 
ultimately a subunit of the Department of the Interior.345 The two offices 
should perform empirical and social science research to supplement the 
largely theoretical and anecdotal evidence of a link between uncertainty in 
the canon of tribal civil jurisdiction, decreased non-tribal investments in 
Indian Country, and alleged non-tribal discrimination against Indians in 
transactions. This data should be gathered with an ultimate goal of 
producing a cost-benefit analysis to support much needed legislative—or 
perhaps administrative—balancing of the apparently conflicting policies of 
tribal judicial sovereignty over non-Indians and tribal economic 
development. A rebalancing, or even mere clarification, of these policies 
would improve predictability and drive non-tribal investments in Indian 
Country far into the future346—and thus this research cooperative should 
qualify as action that the ONABD must prioritize.347 
Reporting of the offices’ findings should not require drastic structural or 
logistical changes in the existing administrative framework because the 
ONABD’s enabling act already requires annual reporting to the Senate 
                                                                                                             
 342. Id. § 4303(b)(1)-(3)(g). 
 343. Id. § 4303(b)(5)(B); see also id. § 4304(e)(2) (calling for prioritization of projects 
leading to “long-term stable international markets for Indian goods and services”). 
 344. See id. § 4303(b)(2) (specifying “shall coordinate”). 
 345. See 25 U.S.C. § 3611(a) (2012) (“There is hereby established within the Bureau [of 
Indian Affairs] the Office of Tribal Justice Support.”); 25 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“There shall be 
in the Department of the Interior a Commissioner of Indian Affairs . . . .”). 
 346. See HOSKISSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 288 (“Changes in government policies can 
dramatically influence the attractiveness of direct foreign investment.”). 
 347. See 25 U.S.C. § 4303(b)(5)(B) (specifying that the Office of Native American 
Business Development “shall give priority to activities that . . . foster long-term stable 
economies of Indian tribes”). 
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Committee on Indian Affairs and the House Committee on Resources to 
fuel legislative initiatives.348 
D. Congress Should Extend the Regulatory Authority of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs to Include Regulatory Jurisdiction over Tribal Civil 
Jurisdiction 
Although Congress could merely allow the ONABD and OTJS to 
perform fact-finding functions and act directly upon those facts at its own 
initiative, Congress has remained silent on the issue of tribal civil 
jurisdiction over non-members through the present, despite the fact that 
courts’ repeated recognition of Congress’s plenary power suggests a desire 
for additional guidance.349 Furthermore, “commentators often agree that 
adjudicating under unclear judicial precedents is so problematic that both 
tribes and states might prefer some type of jurisdiction allocation.”350 Since 
additional legislative guidance would likely add clarity to the legislatively 
unmoored doctrine of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members, and thus 
increase predictability for Investors, Congress should prioritize increasing 
the attractiveness of tribal markets and alleviate the socioeconomic ills 
facing one of the most disadvantaged demographics in the United States.351 
Considering Congress’s longstanding silence—as well as the BIA’s 
subject matter expertise,352 more-direct relationship with tribes,353 and 
                                                                                                             
 348. See id. § 4306(a)-(b) (requiring annual reporting on “any recommendations for 
legislation . . . necessary to carry out sections 4303 through 4305 of this title”). 
 349. See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17 (1987) (“Congress 
undoubtedly has the power to limit tribal court jurisdiction.”); Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. v. 
Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 853 (1985) (“[T]he power of the Federal Government 
over the Indian tribes is plenary.”); Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission 
Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 787 n.30 (1984) (“[I]t is clear that all aspects of Indian sovereignty 
are subject to defeasance by Congress . . . .”); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 562 
(1981) (“If Congress had wished to extend tribal jurisdiction [over hunting and fishing] to 
lands owned by non-Indians, it could easily have done so by incorporating in [18 U.S.C.] § 
1165 the definition of ‘Indian country’ in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 . . . .”); see also Plains 
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 340 (2008) (although a 
formalist opinion, suggesting normative concerns regarding “the desirability of . . . 
regulation” barring transactional discrimination against Native Americans). 
 350. Nakai, supra note 151, at 685-86 (noting that “many tribal-state agreements already 
exist”). 
 351. 25 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(8) (2012) (“Native Americans suffer higher rates of 
unemployment, poverty, poor health, substandard housing, and associated social ills than 
those of any other group in the United States.”). 
 352. 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6 (5th ed. 2010) 
(“Members of Congress . . . lack the expertise necessary to understand the implications of 
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additional insulation from political pressure354—the legislature should 
charge the BIA with regulating tribal civil jurisdiction. The BIA has 
existing research and operational support from the OTJS, and the OTJS is 
already highly experienced in “[o]verse[ing] the continuing operations of 
the Courts of Indian Offenses” and in “[p]romot[ing] cooperation and 
coordination among tribal justice systems and the Federal and State 
judiciary systems.”355 It should be noted the bureau has managed to contain 
its own civil jurisdiction regulations for Courts of Indian Offenses to a mere 
two regulations, each less than one page long,356 all the while monitoring 
and attempting to maintain consistency with Supreme Court precedent on 
civil jurisdiction in the sister tribal courts.357 In light of the need for 
additional research on this issue and the foreseeable need for ongoing 
management and adaptations to the regulatory framework, this “is precisely 
                                                                                                             
the thousands of policy decisions government must make annually. . . . Given its cognitive 
limitations, Congress wisely chooses to delegate most policy decisions to expert bodies that 
can react rapidly to new developments and to new understandings in their areas of 
expertise.”); cf. 7 West’s Fed. Admin. Prac. § 7924 (Westlaw) (updated July 2015) (“One 
compelling justification for the administrative process is the need for ‘expertise.’ . . . 
[relative to a] generalist court . . . .”). 
 353. See 1 Admin. L. & Prac. § 2:37 (3d ed.) (Westlaw) (updated Feb. 2015) (“Still a 
dominant notion in administrative law is flexibility. . . . Administrative law demands that the 
procedures should be designed . . . to best and most efficiently carry out the specific 
decisionmaking task”); 7 West's Fed. Admin. Prac. § 7302 (Westlaw) (“[R]esponsiveness to 
the prescribed goals of the various programs and those of government in general . . . assures 
that the administrative system serves society and thereby all the individuals directly or 
indirectly affected.”). 
 354. PIERCE, supra note 352, § 2.6 (“In an important class of cases, a multimember body 
cannot make a choice among policy options without violating principles of fairness and 
majority rule. . . . In such circumstances, Congress’ only choice is between an indeterminate 
outcome (delegation of broad authority to an agency) and a determinate outcome that is 
dictated by a minority with the power to determine the sequence of votes on the competing 
alternatives.”) (citations omitted); cf. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial 
Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 504-05 (2000) (“The Federal Reserve Board has 
demonstrated that if Congress provides broad delegation of authority to a singular agency 
with a high degree of political independence, then effective regulation is likely, free of 
special interest influence and of transitory political forces having less than rational 
agendas.”). 
 355. 25 U.S.C. § 3611(c)(3)-(5) (2012).  
 356. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.116, 11.118 (2008). 
 357. See, e.g., Law and Order on Indian Reservations, 73 Fed. Reg. 39857-01, 39857 
(July 11, 2008) (changing § 11.116(a)(2) to “compl[y] with Supreme Court rulings on tribal 
jurisdiction”). 
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the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert 
body is especially appropriate.”358  
Although the regulatory history indicates that the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs relies on its facially boundless grant of authority under 25 U.S.C. § 
2 to establish Courts of Indian Offenses359—and the Tenth Circuit has 
previously upheld bureau regulations creating a Court of Indian Offenses 
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2360—the scope of authority courts are willing to 
uphold under this statute seems to be unsettled.361 Furthermore, the 
practically unbounded statute itself may raise challenges under the 
nondelegation doctrine.362 
Therefore, the uncertainty surrounding 25 U.S.C. § 2—the best existing 
statutory support for this comment’s suggested BIA regulations—militates 
in favor of Congress drafting a new enabling statute conforming to 
nondelegation doctrine best practices. 
1. The Statute Should Comply with the Nondelegation Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has indicated that “[t]he nondelegation doctrine is 
rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite 
system of Government.”363 Because the Constitution’s legislative vesting 
clause requires that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested 
                                                                                                             
 358. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989). 
 359. See, e.g., 73 Fed. Reg. 39857-01, 39857 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 301; 25 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13, 
200). 
 360. See Tillett v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 636, 641 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he rule establishing a 
CFR court . . . is rational, based on a consideration of the relevant factors [of urgent need for 
the court], and within the scope of authority delegated to the BIA by [25 U.S.C. § 2].”). 
 361. Compare Org. Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 63 (1962) (holding that 
regulatory jurisdiction conveyed by § 2, “[i]n keeping with the policy of almost total tribal 
self-government prevailing when th[is] statute[] was passed . . . is that to implement specific 
laws . . . not a general power to make rules governing Indian conduct”) with Udall v. Littell, 
366 F.2d 668, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“In charging the Secretary with broad responsibility for 
the welfare of Indian tribes [pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2], Congress must be assumed to have 
given him reasonable powers to discharge it effectively.”). 
 362. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73 (deeming statutory delegations to administrative 
agencies “constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the 
public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority”) (quoting 
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)). But see Robinson v. 
Salazar, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1037 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“This Court does not find that [25 
U.S.C. § 2’s] delegation to the DOI to determine tribal recognition violates the non-
delegation doctrine. . . . [G]eneralized legal authorities are inapplicable in light of the vast 
statutory authority before this Court and including centuries of history and judicial opinions 
adjudicating and upholding the DOI regulations.”). 
 363. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371. 
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in a Congress of the United States,”364 the general rule is that Congress may 
not transfer its legislative authority to the executive or judiciary.365  
In addition to its constitutional underpinnings, the nondelegation 
doctrine is guided by three central policy considerations: 
First, and most abstractly, it ensures to the extent consistent with 
orderly governmental administration that important choices of 
social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our 
Government most responsive to the popular will. . . . Second, the 
doctrine guarantees that, to the extent Congress finds it 
necessary to delegate authority, it provides the recipient of that 
authority with an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide the exercise of 
the delegated discretion. . . . Third, and derivative of the second, 
the doctrine ensures that courts charged with reviewing the 
exercise of delegated legislative discretion will be able to test 
that exercise against ascertainable standards.366 
The Supreme Court has, however, ruled that “the extent and character of 
that assistance [of another branch] must be fixed according to common 
sense and the inherent necessities of the government co-ordination.”367 The 
general rule barring legislative delegation yields, in particular, where 
Congress articulates an “intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform.”368 
The Court has obliquely defined an “intelligible principle” as an articulation 
of “the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the 
boundaries of this delegated authority.”369 An intelligible principle, 
however, need not be stated with exacting precision.370 
The animating policy considerations for the intelligible principle, as an 
exception to the general rule of the nondelegation doctrine, include 
recognition that “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever 
                                                                                                             
 364. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 365. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-72. 
 366. Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 
(1980) (citations omitted). 
 367. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 
U.S. 394, 406 (1928)). 
 368. Id. (quoting J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409). 
 369. Id. at 372-73 (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)); 
see also id. at 379 (calling also for “what the [agency] should do and how it should do it, and 
set[ting] out specific directives to govern particular situations”) (quoting United States v. 
Chambless, 680 F. Supp. 793, 796 (E.D. La. 1988)). 
 370. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (citation omitted). 
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changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”371 
These policy considerations have been so strong that the Supreme Court, at 
least through 2015, had struck only two statutes under the nondelegation 
doctrine—both strikings occurring in 1935.372 Indeed, as one scholar has 
stated, “claims that statutes violate the nondelegation doctrine never 
prevail.”373 Courts have suggested, however, that strong functionalist 
policies militating against strict application of the nondelegation doctrine374 
weaken with substantively broad delegations.375 
Without the benefit of additional data and empirical research, it is 
difficult to suggest a precise intelligible principle Congress could articulate. 
Fortunately, in American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, the Supreme Court 
implicitly recognized this quandary of prospective intelligible principle 
drafting and allowed the articulation of relatively broad intelligible 
                                                                                                             
 371. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. 
 372. See generally A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-
42 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. 
at 416; United States v. Scully, No. 14-CR-208 ADS SIL, 2015 WL 3540466, at *53 
(E.D.N.Y. June 8, 2015) (“[O]nly twice in the Supreme Court's history . . . has it invalidated 
a statute on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative authority.”); Matthew R. 
Bowles, Speak Now or Be Forever Overruled: Deferring to Political ‘Judgment’ in EPA 
Rulemakings, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 591, 598 (2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized the constitutionality of the administrative state, affirming countless 
delegations of legislative authority.”); PIERCE, supra note 352, § 2.6 (“Except for two 1935 
cases, the Court has never enforced its frequently announced prohibition on congressional 
delegation of legislative power”). 
 373. PIERCE, supra note 352, § 2.6; see also id. (indicating that circuit court as well as 
Supreme Court decisions “regularly uphold broad delegations of power”). 
 374. See id. (indicating that Supreme Court justices, since 1989, have largely abandoned 
the nondelegation doctrine owing to “the extreme difficulty of creating a justiciable 
standard,” their “adopt[ion of] a more realistic perspective on the legislative process,” and 
their “recogni[tion] that agencies are politically accountable”). 
 375. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (“[T]he degree of 
agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power 
congressionally conferred.”); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n. 7 (“In recent years, our 
application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to . . . giving narrow 
constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought to be 
unconstitutional.”) (emphasis added); see also PIERCE, supra note 352, § 2.6 (indicating that 
some jurisdictions use the nondelegation doctrine to narrowly interpret delegated authority 
of “extraordinary breadth,” viewing such breadth as a “conflict with a constitutional limit on 
governmental power”); id. (“Even though claims that statutes violate the nondelegation 
doctrine never prevail, they sometimes can improve a petitioner’s prospects of prevailing 
against an agency on other grounds.”). 
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principles in response to “the necessities of modern legislation dealing with 
complex economic and social problems.”376  
That case’s procedural history began with an administrative adjudication, 
where the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) found that two 
subholding companies, part of a holding company system, had violated 
section 11(b)(2) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.377 The 
subholding companies appealed, alleging that the standards articulated in 
the act—“unduly or unnecessarily complicat[ing] the structure . . . of [a] 
holding-company system” and “unfairly or inequitably distribut[ing] voting 
power among security holders . . . of such holding-company system”—were 
“legally meaningless” and left the SEC with “unfettered discretion,” thus 
violating the nondelegation doctrine.378 
Upon Supreme Court review, however, the Court found no violation of 
the nondelegation doctrine.379 The Court held the standards did have 
meaning—“[e]ven standing alone”—although such intelligible principles 
“need not be tested in isolation.”380 Rather, they “derive much meaningful 
content from the purpose of the Act, its factual background and the 
statutory context in which they appear.”381 In evaluating these 
supplementary materials—pointing specifically to codified policy concerns, 
as well as standards and “inquiries” in neighboring statutes—the Court 
found “a veritable code of rules . . . for the Commission to follow in giving 
effect to the standards of § 11(b)(2).”382  
The Court reasoned that “[t]he legislative process would frequently bog 
down if Congress were constitutionally required to appraise before-hand the 
myriad situations to which it wishes a particular policy to be applied and to 
formulate specific rules for each situation.”383 Upon approaching the “point 
beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to 
prescribe detailed rules . . . it then becomes constitutionally sufficient if 
Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is 
to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.”384 
                                                                                                             
 376. 329 U.S. at 104-05. 
 377. Id. at 95-96. 
 378. See id. at 96-97, 104 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(2) (2000) (repealed 2005)). 
 379. Id. at 104. 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. at 105. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id.  
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In view of the close administrative analog of American Power & Light 
Co., also addressing “complex economic and social problems,” Congress 
should emulate this model to focus on articulating “the general policy” of 
support for tribal sovereignty and economies and the BIA’s “boundaries 
of . . . delegated authority.”385 Congress has already articulated much of the 
economic and sovereignty policies,386 which it could easily reorganize or 
incorporate by reference, though it would help for Congress to articulate 
additional guidance on how it would prefer the BIA to balance these 
competing goals. Furthermore, in articulating boundaries of scope and 
degree, Congress should mirror the previously approved statutory language 
of American Power & Light. 
2. Congress Should Confer to the Bureau Only Formal Rulemaking 
Authority with Respect to Tribal Civil Jurisdiction in Tribal Courts 
The heightened importance of issues of tribal sovereignty387 demands 
that Congress (and the BIA) act conservatively and carefully in modifying 
the statutory and regulatory scheme surrounding tribal civil jurisdiction. 
Therefore, Congress should not transfer to the Bureau of Indian Affairs any 
adjudicatory authority over tribal civil jurisdiction, as this would only add 
an extra competing forum to an already confusing mix, producing 
additional cost and delay without any accompanying benefit.388 Among the 
most conservative responses Congress can feasibly pursue would be to 
delegate to the BIA only formal rulemaking authority over the narrow 
realm of tribal civil jurisdiction so as to preserve for soon-to-be regulated 
tribes the maximum procedural protections available under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).389  
Although formal rulemaking fell out of judicial favor with United States 
v. Florida East Coast Railway,390 formal rulemaking also has “powerful 
benefits . . . including the potential to uproot an agency’s faulty 
                                                                                                             
 385. Id. 
 386. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451, 3601, 3652, 4301 (2012). 
 387. See Nakai, supra note 151, at 685 (“Traditionally, tribes view any efforts to limit 
their jurisdiction as a blow to sovereignty . . . .”). 
 388. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94-95 (2009) (requiring that jurisdictional 
rules be based on policies valuing “predictability,” cost savings and expedience, 
“administrative simplicity,” and an avoidance of “greater litigation” and “strange results”). 
 389. See Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 254 
(2014) (“The intuition behind formal rulemaking, however—the notion that informal 
rulemaking’s truncated procedures are sometimes not enough—has never gone away.”). 
 390. 410 U.S. 224 (1973); see also Nielson, supra note 389, at 251 (“This decision . . . 
profoundly undercut formal rulemaking . . . .”). 
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assumptions and increase the public’s confidence in the regulatory 
process.”391 Although Florida East Coast Railway may have rendered the 
once more liberally applied formal rulemaking practically “obsolete,” the 
American Bar Association’s Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory 
Practice has indicated formal rulemaking’s enhanced procedural protections 
remain beneficial in “proceedings of unusual complexity or with a potential 
for significant economic impact”—both of which apply to inquiries of tribal 
civil jurisdiction over non-members.392 
Governed by 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557, formal rulemaking calls for “hearing 
officers, pre-trial conferences, burdens, proposed findings, and cross-
examination, plus . . . a bar on . . . ex parte communications.”393 All of these 
protections would ensure that the various tribes and other parties affected 
will have the best opportunity to orally present evidence before the BIA to 
indicate their concerns regarding any regulations’ effects on tribal 
sovereignty or economics while also ensuring a more accurate and 
transparent response from the agency.394 
Despite the judicial “gutt[ing]” of formal rulemaking in Florida East 
Coast Railway, the Court continues to require agencies to comply with the 
APA’s formal rulemaking procedures where an enabling statute employs 
“text quite close to the magic words, ‘on the record after opportunity for an 
agency hearing.’”395 At issue in that case, section 1(14)(a) of the Interstate 
Commerce Act required the Interstate Commerce Commission to perform 
rulemaking merely “after hearing.”396 The Court held that “after hearing” 
was not synonymous with the formal rulemaking triggering language of § 
553(c): “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.”397 The 
Supreme Court reasoned that this triggering language was articulated by 
Congress, and even though few existing statutes parroted equivalent 
language so as to trigger formal rulemaking, the fact that some statutes did 
meant “adherence to that language cannot be said to render the provision 
                                                                                                             
 391. Nielson, supra note 389, at 292. 
 392. Id. at 257 (quoting Comments on H.R. 3010, The Regulatory Accountability Act of 
2011, ABA SEC. OF ADMIN. LAW & REG. PRAC. (2011), 21, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/administrative_law/commentson3010_final_nocover.authchec
kdam.pdf).  
 393. Id. at 239. 
 394. See id. at 241. 
 395. Id. at 240, 253 (quoting Michael P. Healy, Florida East Coast Railway and the 
Structure of Administrative Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 1039, 1039 (2006)). 
 396. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 236 (1973) (quoting 49 U.S.C. 
§ 1(14)(a) (repealed 1978)). 
 397. Id. at 234 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) (repealed 1978); 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)). 
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nugatory or ineffectual.”398 As such, the Court held that absent formal 
rulemaking’s triggering language, mere “‘hearings’ often need only be the 
submission of written comments.”399 
Simply empowering tribes to submit comments, however, likely offers 
insufficient procedural protection for those who would be impacted by BIA 
regulation of tribal civil jurisdiction. Recognizing the strong federal policy 
of “tribal self-government and self-determination,”400 tribal civil 
jurisdiction should not be casually modified—even to support, in this 
instance, the competing interest of tribal economic development. Rather, 
tribes deserve an opportunity to receive the oral, trial-like procedures of 
formal rulemaking401 to articulate their concerns and goals. 
The extra procedural protections of formal rulemaking, unfortunately, 
are likely to inject delay into the rulemaking process.402 This delay, 
however, is likely to offer “pro-democracy benefits” that would be 
especially valuable in the “controversial” domain of balancing tribal 
sovereignty with tribal economic development.403 As Professor Aaron 
Nielson has explained, though “delay is frustrating to those who want 
immediate action, the [rulemaking] process cannot be short circuited if it is 
to retain its legitimacy.”404 
Therefore, Congress should capture formal rulemaking’s benefits of 
accuracy, transparency, and legitimacy by drafting the BIA’s new enabling 
statute—enabling regulation of tribal civil jurisdiction—so as to include the 
Florida East Coast Railway language that triggers formal rulemaking.405 
3. Suggested Goals Under the Modified Regulatory Framework 
Although there is a need for much additional research before drafting a 
comprehensive response to the problem, Congress should follow Justice 
Souter’s recommendations from Nevada v. Hicks. Justice Souter argued for 
eliminating land as a primary jurisdictional fact to prevent creating “an 
unstable jurisdictional crazy quilt” stemming from the fact that “land on 
Indian reservations constantly changes hands.”406 Such an effect is 
                                                                                                             
 398. Id. at 224, 237-38. 
 399. Nielson, supra note 389, at 252. 
 400. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985). 
 401. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (2012). 
 402. See Nielson, supra note 389, at 282. 
 403. Id. at 282-83. 
 404. Id. at 283. 
 405. See generally United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). 
 406. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 383 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring). 
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problematic, Justice Souter explains, because a jurisdictional rule relying 
primarily on land status “would prove extraordinarily difficult to administer 
and would provide little notice to nonmembers.”407 
While Justice Souter’s land suggestion will certainly help with 
improving predictability in the canon of tribal civil jurisdiction, the BIA 
should also research the costs and benefits of further reducing the number 
of factors in the analysis. Thus, in addition to targeting the factor of land 
ownership for elimination, the BIA should also consider eliminating 
parties’ tribal affiliations—a sort of race proxy—from the formula to 
prevent discriminatory effects. Although this will certainly have effects on 
tribal sovereignty, further research should identify a narrowly tailored 
solution that balances tribal sovereignty, tribal economic development, and 
reduced transactional discrimination. 
Reducing inherent tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction to the reservation 
borders—with no consideration of land ownership or tribal membership—
and providing for minimum contacts analysis408 and long-arm statutes, 409 
much like in federal and state forums today, may be an effective way to 
inject additional certainty into the jurisdictional analysis. However, further 
research should closely consider how these suggestions would impact tribal 
economies and self-governance. 
V. Conclusion 
The labyrinthine doctrine of tribal civil jurisdiction is more than 
frustrating; it is impeding the development of tribal economies. This is a 
complex problem, and the best solution is likely to require some form of 
rebalancing the competing policies of tribal sovereignty and tribal 
economics. That task should be delegated to the Bureau of Indian Affairs to 
put administrative law to work in the arena in which it is most effective—
that of complex problems. In providing for formal rulemaking, this 
administrative solution is designed to give all parties a voice in the process, 
consider all competing interests and, hopefully, achieve a net benefit for all 
parties involved. 
                                                                                                             
 407. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). 
 408. See generally 28 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 65:10 (Westlaw) (updated Dec. 2015) 
(providing thorough coverage of the minimum contacts doctrine). 
 409. See generally Nakai, supra note 151. 
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